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Abstract 
 
A key objective of the Generation IV (Gen IV) International Forum’s Risk and Safety Working Group (RSWG) is the 
development and the qualification of an integrated methodology that can be used to evaluate and document the 
safety of Gen IV nuclear systems. The presentation of the GIF’s Integrated Safety Assessment Methodology (ISAM) 
to different stakeholders, nuclear safety experts and the individual Gen IV System Steering Committees has 
produced a series of comments and suggestions expressing the explicit need for having a more detailed 
description/justification about the "integration" of the different ISAM tools, as well as the request for further 
practical guidelines for its application. 
This EC JRC report prepared as EURATOM contribution to the GIF Risk and Safety Working Group is a Guidance 
Document for ISAM (GDI) developed to answer to the comments and suggestions with a view to facilitate the use 
of the methodology and to provide the users with further help for the ISAM implementation. 
In first instance the GDI document addresses the demonstration of the consistency and the adequateness of ISAM 
for the safety related “design / assessment” process while defining the possible role and contribution of each 
ISAM tool versus the different plant design status (pre-conceptual, conceptual, final; i.e. the step-by-step 
application of ISAM). The consistency with the current requirements and recommendations applicable to future 
nuclear systems is also outlined. In addition, while taking into consideration the experience gained with 
application of ISAM to different innovative design solutions, the GDI also provides a set of examples with the 
intent to help the designers to develop their own applications. 
1 
Guidance Document for Integrated Safety Assessment Methodology 
 
 
 
 
 
Guidance Document for Integrated Safety 
Assessment Methodology (ISAM) - (GDI) 
 
EC JRC report prepared for GIF Risk and Safety Working Group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
Guidance Document for Integrated Safety Assessment Methodology 
 
Table of content: 
 
1 Preamble ................................................................................................................ 4 
1.1 Recall about the ISAM methodology .................................................................... 4 
1.2 Terms of reference for this Guidance Document .................................................. 5 
1.3 Methods & Process ............................................................................................ 5 
1.4 GDI’s Outputs / Deliverables .............................................................................. 5 
2 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 6 
3 Guidance to use ISAM to address the safety related concerns ...................................... 7 
3.1 The safety related “design / assessment” process ................................................ 7 
3.1.1 Safety assessment and safety analysis following the IAEA .............................. 7 
3.1.2 The flowchart for the design and the assessment .......................................... 7 
3.1.3 The risk Informed approach for  an improved implementation of Defence-in-
Depth principle ........................................................................................................ 9 
3.2 The ISAM methodology .................................................................................... 10 
3.3 Safety assessment and verification: the role of ISAM .......................................... 12 
3.3.1 Crosscutting relationships between the flowchart for the design and the 
assessment and the different tools of ISAM .............................................................. 12 
3.3.2 Role and position of the ISAM tools within the flowchart for the design and the 
assessment ........................................................................................................... 14 
3.3.3 Use of the ISAM tools within flowchart for the design and the assessment ..... 17 
3.3.4 Use of the ISAM tools with the Risk Informed Approach ............................... 17 
3.3.5 Consistency and adequateness of the ISAM tools within the flowchart as 
selected by SARGEN IV .......................................................................................... 17 
3.3.6 Consistency and adequateness of the ISAM tools with international safety 
assessment requirements ....................................................................................... 19 
4 Practical examples for the ISAM implementation ....................................................... 20 
4.1 Inputs and Outputs from each ISAM tool ........................................................... 20 
4.1.1 Inputs and Outputs from QSR .................................................................... 20 
4.1.2 Inputs and Outputs from PIRT ................................................................... 20 
4.1.3 Inputs and Outputs from OPT .................................................................... 21 
4.1.4 Inputs and Outputs from DPA .................................................................... 21 
4.1.5 Inputs and Outputs from PSA .................................................................... 23 
4.2 Examples of application for the different tools ................................................... 24 
4.2.1 The case of the Stratified Redan (Internal vessel for a Sodium Fast Reactor) . 24 
4.2.2 The case of the Japan Sodium Fast Reactor (JSFR) ...................................... 29 
4.2.3 Summary of the ISAM Tools concatenation ................................................. 36 
5 Conclusions ........................................................................................................... 36 
3 
Guidance Document for Integrated Safety Assessment Methodology 
 
6 References ............................................................................................................ 38 
Appendix 1 : The glossary of the flowchart (cf. Fig. 2) ..................................................... 41 
Appendix 2 : Safety design principles ............................................................................. 45 
Appendix 3 - Safety requirements .................................................................................. 47 
Appendix 4 : Example of application of the flowchart (cf. Fig. 2) for the  Selection and design 
of the reactivity control system ...................................................................................... 48 
Appendix 5 – The concept of “stratified REDAN” (Ref. 22) ............................................... 49 
Appendix 6 – Excerpt of the ISAM/QSR analysis of the “stratified REDAN” ......................... 50 
Appendix 7 – Excerpt of the ISAM/PIRT analysis of the “stratified REDAN” ........................ 53 
Appendix 8 – The Objective Provision Tree : Application to the JSFR concept .................... 58 
4 
Guidance Document for Integrated Safety Assessment Methodology 
 
Preamble  
1.1 Recall about the ISAM methodology  
A key objective of the Generation IV (Gen IV) International Forum’s Risk and Safety Working 
Group charter is the development and the qualification of an integrated methodology that 
can be used to evaluate and document the safety of Gen IV nuclear systems.  
A first RSWG report issued in 2008 presented the “Basis for the Safety Approach for Design 
& Assessment of Generation IV Nuclear Systems” (Ref. 1).  
Coherently with its mandate, RSWG prepared and delivered in 2011 a second document 
(Ref.2) that describes the Integrated Safety Assessment Methodology (ISAM), for use 
throughout the Gen IV technology development cycle. 
As indicated within the Ref. 2, it is envisioned that the ISAM will be used in three principal 
ways: 
• “The ISAM is intended for use throughout the concept development and design 
phases with insights derived from the ISAM serving to influence the course of the 
design evolution. In this application of the methodology, the ISAM is used to develop 
a more detailed understanding of safety related design vulnerabilities, and resulting 
contributions to risk. Based on this detailed understanding of safety vulnerabilities, 
new safety provisions or design improvements can be identified, developed, and 
implemented relatively early.  
• Selected elements of the methodology will be applied at various points throughout 
the design evolution to yield an objective understanding of risk contributors, safety 
margins, effectiveness of safety-related design provisions, sources and impacts of 
uncertainties, and other safety-related issues that are important to decision makers. 
• The ISAM can be applied in the late stages of design maturity to measure the level 
of safety and risk associated with a given design relative to safety objectives or 
licensing criteria. In this way, the ISAM will allow evaluation of a particular Gen IV 
concept or design relative to various potentially applicable safety metrics or “figures 
of merit.” This post facto application of the ISAM will be especially useful for decision 
makers and regulators who require objective measures of safety for licensing 
purposes, or to support certain late-stage design selection decisions. 
The methodology is NOT intended to dictate design requirements, to dictate compliance with 
quantitative safety goals, or to constrain designers in any other way. The sole intent is to 
provide a useful methodology that contributes to the attainment of Generation IV safety 
objectives, that yields useful insights into the nature of safety and risk of Generation IV 
systems, and that permits meaningful evaluations of Generation IV concepts with respect to 
safety.” 
Coherently with the objectives discussed within the Ref. 1, the methodology is intended to 
support the achievement of a safety that is “built-in” rather than “added on”. 
The methodology has been presented to the different Gen IV System Steering Committees 
during a specific workshop organized in April 2010 in JRC/Petten. Following the workshop 
and the release of the Ref. 2, comments and suggestions were collected.  
Among these comments and suggestions there are the explicit need for having a more 
detailed description/justification about the "integration" of the different ISAM tools, as well 
as the request for further practical guidelines for its application. 
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1.2 Terms of reference for this Guidance Document 
To answer the comments and suggestions, as part of facilitating the use of the methodology, 
the RSWG identified the need to develop a supporting Guidance Document for ISAM (GDI) to 
provide the users with further help for the ISAM implementation. 
This document has been prepared according to the following objectives: 
1) To provide a step-by-step description on how to apply ISAM: 
a) to identify the inputs and outputs of the different tools; 
b) to explain the flow from one step to another; 
c) to elaborate a flow chart in support. 
2) To illustrate a pilot application of ISAM to a specific system or part of system as an 
example. 
 
The GDI has been prepared taking into consideration the experience gained with application 
of ISAM to several innovative design solutions (Ref. 3). 
1.3 Methods & Process 
The following topics are expected to be addressed by the GDI document: 
• The proof of consistency/adequacy between on one side the ISAM tools and structure 
and, on the other side, the current requirements and recommendations applicable to 
future nuclear systems;  
• A summary of ISAM describing, for the different tools, 
o the inputs and outputs; 
o their mutual dependencies. 
• The precise definition of the possible role and contribution of each ISAM tool versus 
the different plant design status (pre-conceptual, conceptual, final; i.e. the step-by-
step application of ISAM). It is proposed that either the single case of a given design 
status (e.g. conceptual design) is considered with the application of the five tools or 
several distinctive combinations of some of the five tools are analysed. 
The EU/JRC accepted to organize and finance the task for the preparation of the GDI first 
draft, which was then reviewed and adopted by GIF RSWG members. 
1.4 GDI’s Outputs / Deliverables 
Coherently with the objectives recalled within the §1.2, the following outputs/outcomes are 
expected from this GDI: 
• Potential ISAM users shall achieve an improved understanding of the proposed 
methodology. 
• All parties (RSWG/ISAM users) shall develop a level of confidence and understanding 
of the methodology through the development of the pilot application; 
 
The GDI could be put in annex to the methodology document or its insights could serve as 
basis for the review of the document itself. It is the latter approach that is adopted within 
the document. 
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2 Introduction 
Among the comments and suggestions collected from the possible users of the Integrated 
Safety Assessment Methodology (ISAM) there are the explicit need for having a more 
detailed description/justification about the "integration" of the different ISAM tools, as well 
as the request for further practical guidelines on its application. 
The Guidance Document for ISAM (GDI) is prepared to answer these comments and 
suggestions and to provide the users with further help for the ISAM implementation. 
Within the context of this document the notion of integration should be interpreted both: 
1) regarding the general context which characterize the activities of design and 
assessment for innovative nuclear systems and  
2) the proof of complementarity and completeness of the whole set of tools to meet the 
searched objectives as they are presented within the section §1.1 above: 
o “The ISAM is intended for use throughout the concept development and 
design phases with insights derived from the ISAM serving to influence the 
course of the design evolution. …..  
o ….. to yield an objective understanding of risk contributors, safety margins, 
effectiveness of safety-related design provisions, etc. 
o The ISAM can be applied in the late stages of design maturity to measure the 
level of safety and risk associated with a given design relative to safety 
objectives or licensing criteria. ….. 
Concerning the first bullet the objective is to check the consistency and the adequateness of 
ISAM to address the safety related concerns raised by the design and the assessment of 
innovative systems (i.e. the safety related “design / assessment” process)1. Such consistency 
and adequateness shall be verified using, as terms of comparison and as far as feasible, 
indications coming from institutions and agencies which are recognized as references for the 
safety concerns: the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Western European 
Nuclear Regulator’s Association (WENRA), National Regulators, International programs 
(MDEP, GIF, INPRO), etc. 
The second bullet addresses the need for practical examples where inputs and outputs of 
each tool are clearly identified as well as the mutual interactions among the tools. On this 
theme one must be aware that a full scope example would be relatively heavy to do and so, 
within the GDI only punctual examples, i.e. focusing on a given provision or a whole nuclear 
system, are developed and presented. 
Following this logic, the document content is divided into two parts. The first one focuses on 
the demonstration of the consistency and the adequateness of ISAM for the safety related 
“design / assessment” process, and the second one provides a set of examples which will 
help the designers to develop their own applications.  
 
 
    
                                           
1 It is worth noting that the compliance with this objective do not impair the possibility for the 
methodology to be used / applied to assess the safety level of designs already defined / available, i.e. 
for plants already in operation or under construction. 
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3 Guidance to use ISAM to address the safety related concerns 
3.1 The safety related “design / assessment” process 
3.1.1 Safety assessment and safety analysis following the IAEA 
According to the definition of IAEA (Ref. 4), the safety assessment is “the systematic process 
that is carried out throughout the design process to ensure that all the relevant safety 
requirements are met by the proposed (or actual) design of the plant. This would include 
also the requirements set by the operating organization and the regulators. Safety 
assessment includes, but is not limited to, the formal safety analysis”.  
Still following the IAEA : “The design and the safety assessment are part of the same 
iterative process conducted by the plant designer which continues until a design solution 
meets all the requirements for management of safety, the principal technical requirements, 
the plant design and plant system design requirements (cf. for example Ref. 5) and that a 
comprehensive safety analysis has been carried out”. 
Regarding safety analysis, IAEA (Ref. 5 - Requirement 42) states that: “A safety analysis of 
the design for the nuclear power plant shall be conducted in which methods of both 
deterministic analysis and probabilistic analysis shall be applied….  
……the design basis for items important to safety and their links to initiating events and 
event sequences shall be confirmed.  
It shall be demonstrated that the nuclear power plant as designed is capable …….. of 
meeting acceptable limits for accident conditions. 
The safety analysis shall provide assurance that defence in depth has been implemented …. 
provide assurance that uncertainties have been given adequate consideration …..” 
According to these indications the safety assessment is first of all the qualitative check that 
the system and its safety architecture are compatible with the principles, the requirements 
and the guidelines formulated by agencies and organizations responsible for verifying the 
safety of the installations.  
The safety analysis, which is integral part of this assessment, verifies the conformity with the 
quantitative safety objectives including the uncertainties; this conformity guarantees the 
protection which is requested for the operators, the public and the environment. 
3.1.2 The flowchart for the design and the assessment 
The Fig. 1, extracted from the Ref. 1, shows the design process suggested for innovative 
systems: around the “reactor process”, in which design and performances are defined to 
fulfill the basic requirements, a safety related architecture2 is built up to insure the 
operability, the availability and the safety of the system.  
 
                                           
2 Safety architecture : The full set of provisions – inherent characteristics, technical options and 
organizational measures – selected for the design, the construction, the operation including the shut 
down and the dismantling, which are taken to prevent the accidents or limit the effects. 
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Fig. 1– Iterative process for the construction of the safety architecture 
The design process, as shown in Fig. 1, is obviously part of a wider context into which the 
designer has to integrate the principles, the recommendations and the other guidelines 
which come from the regulator(s); in this context the designer develops his safety approach, 
that is: defines the strategy, chooses safety goals and objectives as well as the safety 
options which form the base of the architecture which is organized to guarantee the safety 
of the installation. Once this approach is defined and the situations which have to be 
considered for the design basis identified, the construction of the safety architecture can 
begin with the selection and the sizing of provisions to be implemented. 
The overall process is first the object of a self – assessment by the designer to ensure that 
safety objectives are met. Once this step achieved, it is the entire process, including the 
results of this assessment, which is submitted for discussion / endorsement to the regulator3. 
The flowchart presented on Fig. 2 (Ref. 64) shows the global context within which the design 
/ assessment / discussions / endorsement process should be inscribed. The iterative process 
for the construction of the safety architecture (Fig. 1) does correspond - and can be 
recognized –  to the lower part of the flowchart. 
One can point out that the flowchart’s content complies with the indications of the IAEA for 
the safety assessment and verification of nuclear power plants (Ref.4); in fact the 
justification of the safety approach, i.e. the selection of design options and the strategy for 
the design and sizing of the selected provisions against the principle, requirements, 
guidelines, goals and objectives, is referred as the “Safety assessment”. More precisely, the 
design options have to be justified against the goals, objectives, principle, requirements and 
guidelines (upper part of the flowchart), while the selected provisions have to comply with 
the design and operational safety specifications established for them (i.e. through the safety 
analysis; bottom part of the flowchart).  
                                           
3 ISAM method was developed to organize and facilitate the assessment / discussions between the 
designer and the regulator to achieve this endorsement by the safety authorities. 
4 An example of scheme has been developed by the Belgian Federal Agency of Nuclear Control 
(FANC), within the context of the MYRRHA pre-licensing process, for the discussions / exchanges 
between the regulator and the designer (SCK-MOL). 
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Fig. 2 – Flowchart for the design / assessment / discussions / endorsement process;  
scheme for the design and the implementation of the safety architecture 
The content of this flowchart remains quite generic and basically “technology neutral” and 
this is why it is suggested as main guideline to check the consistency and the adequateness 
of ISAM to address the safety related concerns raised by the design and the assessment of 
innovative systems. 
To avoid, or at least reduce, the risk of ambiguity in the interpretation of the flowchart, the 
meaning of terms used within the Fig. 2 is detailed within the Appendix 1 (coupled with 
Appendix 2 & 3). 
As a matter of example, the Appendix 4 (cf. Fig. A4-1) shows an example of flow chart 
content for the selection and the design of provisions related to the reactivity control. 
3.1.3 The risk Informed approach for  an improved implementation of 
Defence-in-Depth principle 
As outlined by the Ref. 1, the final acceptability of a concept should remain based on the 
degree of meeting the Defence-in-Depth (DiD) principles. The strategy of DiD (i.e. the 
adoption of adequate safety architectures) ensures that the fundamental safety functions are 
reliably achieved and with sufficient margins to compensate for equipment failure, human 
errors and hazards, including the uncertainty associated with estimating such events. This 
can be done through homogeneous coverage of the risk domain from frequent abnormal 
events to very low frequency high consequence accidents including events with large 
uncertainty even very low frequency” such as extreme external hazards that the designer will 
be asked to consider in case-by-case manner.  
This coverage is attained by using the best data from experience feedback (when available) 
for improving the quality of data and analyses, and developing a systematic methodology to 
identify and manage the risks. Moreover, this methodology has so to merge Defence-in-
Depth and probabilistic insights generating a Risk Informed approach.  
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Following the Ref. 2, with this approach, “risk insights are considered together with other 
factors to establish requirements that better focus the attention on design and operational 
issues commensurate with their importance to health and safety”.  
Such a philosophy enhances the traditional approach by:  
(a) allowing explicit consideration of a broader set of potential challenges to safety,  
(b) providing a logical means for prioritizing these challenges based on risk significance, 
operating experience, and/or engineering judgment,  
(c) facilitating consideration of a broader set of resources to defend against these 
challenges, 
(d) explicitly identifying and quantifying sources of uncertainty in the analysis, and  
(e) leading to better decision-making by providing a means to test the sensitivity of the 
results to key assumptions. 
The Fig. 3 (Ref. 1) summarizes the logic suggested by the Ref. 1: 
Safety Goals & Objectives
Fundamental Safety Functions
Defence in Depth levels :
1st – Prevention
2nd- Surveillance and control
3rd – Accident management
4th – Control of Severe Conditions and Mitigation
5th – Mitigation of radiological Consequences
Risk Informed
technical & operational
safety requirements
applicable to the design 
Probabilistic
success criteria
Deterministic
success criteria
 
Fig. 3 – Defence in depth and Risk-Informed Safety Philosophy 
The deterministic and probabilistic considerations, including success criteria, are therefore 
integrated into the comprehensive implementation of defence in depth.  
Such success criteria are essential to correctly design the provisions that implement the 
levels of the DiD; the performances of these provisions have to be defined in terms of 
physical performances and required reliability; finally the provisions have to be – if 
needed/justified – safety classified. The final goal of this process is the optimization of the 
whole safety related architecture in terms of performances, reliability and costs.  
 
3.2 The ISAM methodology 
The ISAM methodology is described in detail within the Ref. 2. It consists of five distinct 
analytical tools, each of which can be used to answer specific kinds of safety-related 
questions with different degrees of detail, and at different stages of design maturity (cf. Fig. 
4 below).  
The methodology is integrated, as evidenced by the fact that the results of each analysis tool 
support or relate to inputs or outputs of other tools. Although individual analytical tools can 
be selected for individual and exclusive use, the full value of the integrated methodology is 
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derived from using each tool, in an iterative manner and in combination with the others, 
throughout the development cycle. Fig. 4 details the overall task flow of the ISAM and 
indicates which tools are intended for use in each phase of Generation IV system technology 
development.  
 
Fig. 4 Proposed GIF Integrated Safety assessment Methodology (ISAM) Task Flow 
Each of the analysis tools that are part of the ISAM is briefly described here (cf. within the 
Ref. 2 the Appendix 2 to 6 for details): 
• Qualitative Safety Features Review (QSR) 
The Qualitative Safety Features Review (QSR) provides a systematic means of ensuring and 
documenting that the evolving Gen IV system concept of design incorporates the desirable 
safety-related attributes and characteristics that are identified and discussed within the 
significant references for principles, requirements and guidelines (IAEA, GIF, INPRO, etc.). 
The QSR provides a useful means of shaping designers’ approaches to their work to help 
ensure that safety truly is “built-in, not added-onto” since the early phases of the design of 
Gen IV systems. The QSR serves as a useful preparatory step for other elements of the ISAM 
by promoting a richer understanding of the developing design in terms of safety issues or 
vulnerabilities that will be analyzed in more depth in those other analytical steps. 
• Phenomena Identification and Ranking Table (PIRT) 
The Phenomena Identification and Ranking Table (PIRT) is a technique that has been widely 
applied in both nuclear and non-nuclear applications. As applied to Gen IV nuclear systems, 
the PIRT is used to identify a spectrum of safety-related phenomena or scenarios that could 
affect those systems, and to rank order those phenomena or scenarios on the basis of their 
importance (often related to their potential consequences), and the state of knowledge 
related to associated phenomena (i.e., sources and magnitudes of phenomenological 
uncertainties).  
The method relies heavily on expert elicitation, but provides a discipline for identifying those 
issues that will undergo more rigorous analysis using the other tools of ISAM. As such, the 
PIRT forms an input to both the Objective Provision Tree (OPT cf. below) analyses, and the 
Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA). The PIRT is particularly helpful in defining the course of 
accident sequences, and in defining safety limits. The PIRT is essential in helping to identify 
areas in which additional research may be helpful to reduce uncertainties. 
• Objective Provision Tree (OPT) 
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Following the logic illustrated by the Fig.1, the purpose of the Objective Provision Tree (OPT) 
is to ensure and document the provision of essential “lines of protection” to ensure 
successful prevention, control or mitigation of phenomena that could potentially damage the 
nuclear system. As such it can be considered as an innovative mean to represent the whole 
safety architecture.  
There is a natural interface between the OPT and the PIRT in that the PIRT identifies 
phenomena and issues that could potentially be important to safety, and the OPT focuses on 
identifying design provisions intended to prevent, control, or mitigate the consequences of 
those phenomena. 
The OPT can be extremely useful in helping to focus and structure the analyst’s identification 
and understanding of possible initiators and mechanisms of abnormal conditions, accident 
phenomenology, success criteria, and related issues.  
• Deterministic and Phenomenological Analyses (DPA) 
Conventional deterministic and phenomenological analyses, including the due consideration 
for the uncertainties, will be used to perform the quantitative analysis which supports the 
development and the sizing of the safety architecture.  They will feed the PSA as an essential 
input to quantify the results.  
It is anticipated that DPA will be used from the late portion of the pre-conceptual design 
phase through ultimate licensing and regulation of the Generation IV system. 
• Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) 
Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) is a widely accepted, integrative method that is rigorous, 
disciplined, and systematic, and therefore it forms the principal basis of the ISAM. PSA can 
only be meaningfully applied to a design that has reached a sufficient level of maturity and 
detail. Thus, PSA is performed and iterated beginning in the late pre-conceptual design 
phase, and continuing until the final design stages.  
In fact, as the concept of the “living PSA” is becoming increasingly accepted, the RSWG 
advocates the idea of applying PSA at the earliest practical point in the design process, and 
continuing to use it as a key decision tool throughout the life of the plant or system. 
Although the other elements of the ISAM have significant value as stand-alone analysis 
methods, their value is enhanced by the fact that they serve as useful tools in helping to 
prepare for and to shape the PSA once the design has matured to a point where the PSA can 
be successfully applied. 
3.3 Safety assessment and verification: the role of ISAM 
3.3.1 Crosscutting relationships between the flowchart for the design 
and the assessment and the different tools of ISAM 
Once goals, objectives, principles, requirements, guidelines and safety options have been 
selected, the full process (iterative as needed) for the design and the assessment of the 
retained safety architecture (including the safety analysis) can be summarized as follows: 
1. Looking for compliance / consistency of the design options with the principles, 
requirements and guidelines,  
2. Identification, prioritization and correction (if feasible) of discrepancies between 
design options with the principles, requirements and guidelines, 
3. Identification of challenges to the safety functions, 
13 
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4. Identification of mechanisms (initiating events) and selection of significant (envelope) 
plants conditions to be considered for the design basis, 
5. Identification and selection of needed provisions, 
6. Design and sizing of the provisions, 
7. Analysis of the response to transients (safety analysis), 
8. Final assessment5 for a safety architecture that should be (Ref. 1 §III.5.1): 
o Exhaustive, 
o Progressive, 
o Tolerant, 
o Forgiving, 
o Balanced. 
The following table 1 resumes the crosscutting relationships between, on one side, the items 
above and, on the other side, the different tools of ISAM and demonstrates the integrated 
character of the ISAM tools versus the safety assessment objective.  
 
Q
S
R
 
P
I
R
T
 
O
P
T
 
D
P
A
 
P
S
A
 
Regulatory Framework (Goals, objectives, principles, 
requirements, guidelines) 
     
Selection of Safety Options and provisional Provisions      
1. Compliance / consistency of the design options with the 
principles, requirements and guidelines  
     
2. Identification, prioritization and correction (if feasible) of 
discrepancies between design options with the principles, 
requirements and guidelines, 
  ()6 () () 
3. Identification of challenges to the safety functions,      
4. Identification of mechanisms (initiating events) and 
selection of significant (envelope) plants conditions to be 
considered for the design basis, 
     
5. Identification and selection of needed provisions,      
6. Design and sizing of the provisions,      
7. Response to transients (safety analysis),      
8. Final assessment for a safety architecture that should be:      
o Exhaustive,      
o Progressive,      
o Tolerant,      
o Forgiving,      
o Balanced.      
Table 1 : Crosscutting relationships between the steps for the design and the assessment 
and the different tools of ISAM 
                                           
5 The whole process is itself an assessment of the safety architecture characteristics. The distinction here is made between the 
design and sizing of the architecture and its assessment of exhaustiveness, progression, tolerance, forgivingness and balance.  
6 While QSR and PIRT are identified as the main ISAM tools for this process, the outcomes of other ISAM tools can used in 
successive iterations. 
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The crosscutting relationships as presented within the Table 1 allow integrating the ISAM 
tools within the global Flowchart for the design / assessment / discussions / endorsement 
process, as presented on Fig. 2. The table is also the basis for the elaboration of the inputs / 
outputs for each ISAM tools (cf.§ 4). 
3.3.2 Role and position of the ISAM tools within the flowchart for the 
design and the assessment  
In parallel to the selection of the safety goals and safety objectives which are proposed by 
the designer but must be  agreed with the regulator, the designer also selects the set of 
criteria for designing structure, system or components (upper right part of the flowchart on 
Fig. 2).  
The availability of the QSR will allow the designer to check the compliance of its choices (i.e. 
the selected safety options and selected provisional provisions) versus the regulatory 
framework (principles, requirements and guidelines - upper left part of the Fig. 2) (cf. Fig. 
5). This analysis represents the foundation and the rationale for the justification of the 
provisions, once defined. Fig. 5 resumes this logic and illustrates the correspondence 
between the different steps of the flow chart (Fig. 2) and the ISAM tools (Fig. 4). 
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Fig. 5 - Correspondence between the different steps of the flow chart and the ISAM tools 
PIRT, OPT, DPA and PSA will intervene within the second part (bottom part) of the flowchart 
on Fig. 2: 
• Design & operational safety specifications applicable to the selected provisions which 
to allow guaranteeing safety margins; 
• Design and sizing of Provisions which allow building up of the Safety Architecture 
for all the levels of the DiD. 
Starting from the challenges to the different safety functions and analyzing the phenomena 
which are important for the safety of the installation, the PIRT (Ref. 2 §2.5.4.1) will 
contribute to the identification of challenges to the safety functions and their mechanisms 
(initiating events) and help the selection of significant (envelope) plants conditions to be 
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considered for the design basis; the status of knowledge versus the importance of the 
phenomena, as well as the availability and the degree of qualification / validation of tools for 
their simulation, will contribute, in close connection with the OPT, to identify the needed 
provisions and motivate their selection while identifying, prioritizing and correcting (if 
feasible) discrepancies or gaps (cf. Table 1 & Fig. 5a, step 1). 
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Fig. 5a - Step for the implementation of the PIRT within the second part of the flowchart 
In parallel to the PIRT analysis, the implementation of the OPT allows structuring the whole 
safety architecture. The challenges to the safety functions are identified as well as the 
mechanisms which materialize these challenges. Coherently with the defined safety options, 
the provisions are identified and their contribution organized within the safety architecture 
(i.e. the Lines of Protection - LOP). The boundary conditions for the sizing of the provision 
are roughly defined. The contribution of the OPT is essential to help guaranteeing the 
independence between the levels of the DiD as well as the exhaustiveness and the 
progressiveness of the safety architecture (cf. Table 1 & Fig. 5b, step 2).  
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Fig. 5b - Step for the implementation of the OPT within the second part of the flowchart 
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The architecture being available from the OPT/PIRT, and knowing the missions which need 
to be achieved, the DPA trough the corresponding analysis of the response to transients 
(safety analysis) allows finalizing the design and sizing of the provisions to insure that the 
safety objectives are met. The contribution of the DPA is also essential to verify the 
progressive, tolerant and forgiving character of the safety architecture (cf. Table 1 & Fig. 5c, 
step 3).  
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Fig. 5c - Step for the implementation of the DPA within the second part of the flowchart 
Finally, with the safety architecture provided by the OPT and the quantitative analysis from 
the DPA, the contribution of the PSA, with its different levels, allows closing the safety 
analysis guaranteeing the meeting of the probabilistic objectives for the different feared 
events: core damage frequency, off-site releases, etc.. Finally one must outline the 
irreplaceable role of PSA to check the Progressive, Tolerant, Forgiving and Balanced 
character of the safety architecture (cf. Table 1 & Fig. 5d, step 4).  
The Fig. 5d details the role of PIRT, OPT, DPA and PSA within the second part of the 
flowchart 
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Fig. 5d - Step for the implementation of the PSA within the second part of the flowchart 
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3.3.3 Use of the ISAM tools within flowchart for the design and the 
assessment  
As indicated within the §2, the objective of the document is to check the consistency and the 
adequateness of ISAM to address the safety related concerns raised by the design and the 
assessment of innovative systems (i.e. the safety related “design / assessment” process). 
The proof of consistency and adequateness of ISAM is both a problem of theoretical 
coverage of these concerns as well as a problem of practical aptitude of the tools to address 
the concerns. In accordance with the objective of the document, the table 1 and the Fig. 5, 
5a  5d bring insights for the demonstration to prove the full coverage, in an integrated 
way, of the concerns raised by the needs for the design and the assessment of innovative 
systems.  
The inherent capacity of the tools, both singularly and collectively, to address the concerns’ 
content is addressed within the section 4.  
3.3.4 Use of the ISAM tools with the Risk Informed Approach 
This “Risk Informed” approach is discussed within the § 3.1.3 and showed within the Fig. 3. 
This approach, looking for and considering simultaneously deterministic and probabilistic 
insights, suggests that the use of Objective Provision Tree, to build and structure the safety 
architecture, and Probabilistic Safety Assessment, for the whole safety assessment, as main 
tools to evaluate, in a systematic way, the implementation of Defence in Depth principle. 
Deterministic assessments, including engineering evaluations, consideration of human factor 
and ‘traditional” deterministic safety analysis (DPA) are needed to support the application of 
OPT and PSA.  
Deterministic safety analyses (DPA), in this context, are first of all needed to evaluate the 
adequacy of the chosen provisions (combined in lines of protection within the OPT) to fulfill 
their expected functions and establish “success criteria” for the System, Structures and 
Components modeled in the PSA. Deterministic analyses are also needed to determine the 
consequences in terms of “acceptability or not” of different event sequences modeled in the 
PSA.  R&D efforts, also driven by PIRT exercises, shall be conducted to support deterministic 
model validations as well as accident sequence outcomes assessment. 
3.3.5 Consistency and adequateness of the ISAM tools within the 
flowchart as selected by SARGEN IV  
It is important to note the consistency between on the one hand the logic presented in Fig. 
2, summarized in Table 1 and reflected in Fig. 5, 5a  5d, and the positions shown by the 
flowchart from the European Project SARGEN IV for the safety assessment, as included in 
Fig. 6 (Ref. 20). 
The two phases of the safety assessment are clearly identified:  
• verification of the compliance of the system with the principles, the requirements, the 
guidelines defined by the regulator as well as with the safety goals and objectives 
developed by the designer and  
• verification of the conformity of the safety architecture of the system with the 
quantitative safety objectives, translated into physical parameters or “decoupling 
criteria”.  
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These phases are decomposed into basic steps that compose the overall assessment process 
whose iterative character is evident for both phases.  
For each step the main reference tools ascribed to fulfill the tasks are highlighted.  
In this respect the flowchart associates the different steps with the relevant ISAM tools 
showing the integrated nature of ISAM with respect to the safety assessment process. 
 
Fig. 6 - Flowchart of the design/safety assessment and relevance of the ISAM/INPRO tools 
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3.3.6 Consistency and adequateness of the ISAM tools with 
international safety assessment requirements  
The adequacy of ISAM tools to ensure the comprehensive safety evaluation of GEN IV 
reactor systems that would allow to demonstrate their compliance with current high level 
safety requirements was done with respect to the activity of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA), National Regulators, International programs (GIF, INPRO), WENRA (Ref. 7-
17). 
Some details on the above mentioned analyses could be found in Ref. 18 and Ref. 19, where 
the appropriateness of QSR grid content was verified with, on one hand, the content of the 
INPRO methodology (Ref.18) and, on the other hand, with the contents of IAEA SSR-2/1 
(Ref. 19). 
Concerning the crosscut comparison with the INPRO Basic principles/ User requirements 
(Ref. 18), the analysis shows that improvements were required for the RSWG QSR. Similarly 
need for improvements are identified for the INPRO methodology. The set of RSWG/QSR 
recommendation has been corrected within the current version to integrate the inputs from 
the analysis.  
The comparison between the ISAM/QSR and the IAEA SSR-2/1 (Ref. 19) proves the 
relevance and the pertinence of the ISAM/QSR and its recommendations. Following the 
comparison few corrections are suggested and need to be introduced within the QSR table in 
order to achieve the full consistency and to attain a set of recommendations which will be 
applicable to the design or the assessment of the provisions of the safety architecture of 
innovative nuclear system. 
The analysis of these specific issues has to be done with, in the background, the 
recommendations which are available and applicable to the future reactors. These indications 
include, among others, those by WENRA (Ref. 8) which are actually under publication. 
Two notions/tools appear to be perfectly consistent with the requirements proposed by 
WENRA (Ref. 31 §03.1): the "Line of Protection - LOP", which extends that of “Line of 
Defense” used so far, and the Objective Provision Tree (OPT), which is intended as a tool for 
the organization of the safety architecture. 
While in general good consistency was found, it is evident that for each of the GEN IV 
systems specific safety assessments will need to be performed to demonstrate compliance 
with international safety requirements. 
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4 Practical examples for the ISAM implementation 
4.1 Inputs and Outputs from each ISAM tool 
N.B.:  
Details concerning each of the ISAM tools are provided within the Ref.2 (Appendix 2 to 6) 
4.1.1 Inputs and Outputs from QSR 
The QSR provides the designer with a check list summarizing the good practices and 
recommendations which can be useful to verify that the design details are coherent with the 
recommendations which are available from different sources, and applicable to the future 
nuclear systems. 
The tool can be applied to a system as a whole or to a given provision, implemented to 
achieve a well-defined mission. Moreover the tool can be applied  
• to check the consistency of the system / provisions characteristics versus the good 
practices and recommendations; 
• to compare two or more solutions in order to show advantages and or disadvantages 
of one solution versus the other. 
The inputs for the QSR are basically the utmost knowledge available of the system/provision 
and its behaviour.  
Following the use made by the designer, the expected outputs are: 
• The compliance – or not – vis à vis the good practices and recommendations in order 
to identify the strong characteristics as well as the possible weakness, knowing that 
the latter can mask showstoppers or simply issues that should be solved to improve 
the performances / compliance of the solution under examination. 
• The advantages and or disadvantages of one solution versus the other. 
Knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of the solution, as well as the advantages or 
disadvantages of a solution versus another possible solution, allow the designer to identify 
and motivate the subsequent steps and efforts to achieve an optimized solution or, if 
justified, to motivate the abandonment of the solution under examination. 
4.1.2 Inputs and Outputs from PIRT 
The PIRT is a proven formalized subjective decision-making tool, which is exhaustive, 
defendable, and auditable; it provides the designer with a consistent view about what is 
needed to achieve, for a given design, a robust safety demonstration. 
The technique helps to systematically identify system/provision vulnerabilities and generates 
a ranked table which helps identifying contributions to safety and risk. One of the distinct 
advantages of the technique is to identify the “knowledge level” for a given phenomenon, 
which, compared with the significance of the phenomenon, helps detecting the gaps in 
knowledge areas requiring additional research and data collection. 
For the system/provision under examination, the PIRT is applied within the context of a 
given scenario/condition which follows a given initiating event; in this context it will identify, 
recognize, and qualify the relative importance of all relevant phenomena, versus selected 
Figure of Merit (FoM)7, with the associated rationales. This step is an essential 
complementary contribution to the OPT/PSA for the selection, versus a given challenge to a 
safety function, of initiating events which are significant from safety/risk point of view. 
                                           
7 The FOM is the primary evaluation criterion used to judge the relative importance of each 
phenomenon 
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The advantage of the process is that it can be applied to conceptual designs as well as more 
mature designs. Information can be obtained on analytical tools used to simulate accident 
scenarios as well as on the behaviour of the process during accident scenarios.  
4.1.3 Inputs and Outputs from OPT 
If adopted during the design process the OPT allows the designer to build and structure the 
safety architecture following the principle of the defense in depth. If used for the evaluation 
of an existing architecture the OPT allows assessing the defence in depth capabilities, 
including both the plant design features and the operational measures taken to ensure 
safety.  
In both cases, a systematic identification of the required safety provisions for the siting, 
design, construction and operation of the plant provides the basis for insuring the 
comprehensiveness and quality of defence in depth at the plant. 
The logic for building the safety architecture is that represented by the iterative process 
shown in Fig. 1. 
OPT inputs are firstly the characteristics of the process around which the designer wants to 
build and organize the safety architecture.  
In parallel it is important to define the "controlled & safe plant states" needed to define the 
tasks/missions that provisions of the architecture must achieve: for each incidental or 
accidental condition the safety architecture must be able to maintain or restore the 
installation in a "controlled or safe plant states". This will be done with objectives that are 
specific to the level of defense in depth under review. Finally, as the process of structuring 
the architecture progresses, among the inputs to be considered there will be the possible 
failures of provisions/LOP implemented within the previous levels. 
The output of the OPT is the safety architecture with, for each initiator, and for each level of 
DiD, an indication about the provisions that materialize the corresponding line of protection. 
At this stage, the detailed design of the single provisions is not necessarily finalized because 
it is the role of the detailed DPA calculations to confirm the sizing of the provisions singularly 
and of the architecture as a whole. 
4.1.4 Inputs and Outputs from DPA 
As indicated above, conventional deterministic and phenomenological analyses (DPA), 
including the due consideration for the uncertainties, are used to perform the quantitative 
analysis which supports the development and the sizing of the safety architecture. All the 
design plant conditions – both those of the Design Basis as well as those of the Design 
Extension Conditions – are analyzed with rules which are specific to each family of 
conditions. DPA are used from the late portion of the pre-conceptual design phase through 
ultimate licensing and regulation of the Generation IV system. 
Key inputs for the studies are, on one side, the safety architecture – as provided, for 
example by the OPT - which covers all the involved provisions and their interaction and, on 
the other side, the physical performances of each provision. For each provision, the physical 
performances are the result of a specific work made by the designer as a complement of the 
definition of the safety architecture. 
The ultimate goal being the verification that safety objectives are met, the results of the DPA 
(outputs) are on one hand the confirmation of the relevance of the implemented architecture 
as well as that of the connections between the provisions and, on the other hand, the 
acceptability of the design and sizing of these provisions. The possible non-compliance with 
the safety objectives leads the designer to be back to the input data of the studies, whether 
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the architecture, the connections between the provisions or the provisions characteristics 
themselves. 
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4.1.5 Inputs and Outputs from PSA 
The Fig. 7 shows the principal steps in PSA Process (Ref. 21) 
Accident Frequencies
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Accident Progression Bins
Source Term Groups
Consequence Measures
Accident Progression, Containment
Loading, and Structure Response
Transport of 
Radioactive Material
Offsite Consequences
Risk Integration
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
 
Fig. 7 principal steps in PSA Process 
PSA inputs and outputs are summarized within the Fig. 8 through the representation of the 
detailed steps in PSA (Ref. 21). 
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Fig. 8 Detailed steps in PSA Process 
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Each of these boxes must be supplied adequately with the support ISAM tools. For example 
the "Initiating Event Analysis" resume mechanisms identified by the OPT, the “Event tree 
analysis" will be built on the basis of the architecture provided by the OPT, the "Accident 
sequence quantification” presents the results of DPA step as well as the "Source term 
analysis", etc.. The “Phenomenon analysis" will be realized with the support of the PIRT 
analysis. External data are obviously to be considered, so for example the "Human reliability 
analysis" or even the "Common causes failure analysis." 
Having said that, one can outline the specific strengths of PSA (Ref. 21):  
• Rigorous, systematic analysis tool; Information integration (multidisciplinary); Allows 
consideration of complex interactions; Develops qualitative design insights; Develops 
quantitative measures for decision making; Provides a structure for sensitivity 
studies; Provides a structure for uncertainty analysis of input parameter values;  
while being aware about the principal limitations of PSA 
• Sparseness of available data especially for new reactor types; Lack of understanding 
of physical processes (again, especially for new reactor types); High sensitivity of 
some results to assumptions; Constraints on modeling effort (limited resources); 
Simplifying assumptions (Truncation of results during quantification); Lack of 
completeness (e.g., human errors of commission typically not considered); PSA is 
typically a snapshot in time. 
Specific concerns can rise for the treatment of External Events and from the consideration of 
uncertainties, both for their identification and their propagation. 
On the other side it is important to be aware of the powerful role of the PSA for the final and 
integrative safety assessment. Besides the verification of the meeting of the safety objective, 
the PSA will finally bring irreplaceable insights concerning the Progressive, Tolerant, 
Forgiving, Balanced character of the safety architecture. 
 
4.2 Examples of application for the different tools 
4.2.1 The case of the Stratified Redan (Internal vessel for a Sodium Fast 
Reactor) 
4.2.1.1 Example of application for the QSR 
The Ref.23 presents a first application of the ISAM/QSR on an innovative concept which was 
under design and assessment at the CEA/DEN/DER: the so called “Stratified REDAN” (cf. Ref. 
22 and Appendix 5 for a short description of the concept). 
The concept of Stratified Redan for the reactor internals is compared with the conventional 
EFR solution to identify the favourable as well as the unfavourable characteristics of this 
innovative solution. 
The exercise shows that the tool is capable to help the designer to qualitatively assess the 
design options identifying strong characteristics or safety vulnerabilities. 
This is obviously one step of an iterative process where the designer is invited to focus his 
attention on the identified vulnerabilities to look for solution’s improvements or alternative 
solutions. 
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The Appendix 6 is an excerpt of the ISAM/QSR application including some key conclusions 
(in red) from the Ref. 23 to give an idea of the nature of the insights which can be provided 
by the analysis. 
4.2.1.2 Example of application for the PIRT 
Within the Ref.24, as a matter of example, the PIRT is implemented for the Stratified REDAN 
for three plant conditions: 
• the nominal operational conditions 
• one transient configuration : the abrupt rundown for the pumps which are located on 
the primary heat exchanger  
• earthquake 
Within the Ref.25 the PIRT is implemented, still for the Stratified REDAN concept, for the 
transition “forced  natural convection” (e.g. following the primary pumps run down) to 
achieve a status where the decay heat is fully be removed in natural convention. 
The Appendix 7 is an excerpt of the ISAM/PIRT analysis including the identification of the 
figures of merit (FOM) and some conclusions from the Ref. 25 to give an idea of the nature 
of the insights which can be provided by the analysis. 
4.2.1.3 Example of application for the OPT 
4.2.1.3.1 OPT – Generalities  
At least two examples of application of the OPT method are available in the open literature. 
The first in order of time is the IAEA Tecdoc 1366 (Ref. 26) which deals with the safety 
architecture of the Modular High Temperature Gas Reactor (MHTGR). 
The second is presented within the IAEA SR 46 (Ref. 27). In this reference, a test application 
of the screening method has been performed by the IAEA in collaboration with the staff of 
the Bohunice plant8 within the framework of the preparation of the safety upgrading 
program for the V-2 plants.  
The objective of the Ref. 26 was to propose a technical basis and methodology, based on 
principles of defence in depth, for conducting design safety assessments and, in the long 
term, generating design safety requirements for innovative reactors.  
The MHTGR was used as an example to illustrate this process. The document provides an 
overview of the safety related features of current MHTGR technology, examines how the 
defence in depth principle can be implemented/adopted by the MHTGR design, and how 
MHTGR designs could satisfy the three fundamental safety objectives: 1) general nuclear 
safety; 2) radiation protection; 3) technical safety. The application to MHTGRs, although very 
preliminary, proved that the method is viable and useful. 
The Ref. 26 recognizes that the top-down approach, as discussed within the report, is 
applicable to any kind of reactor, however, how defence in depth is implemented and the 
implications on safety requirements remain concept specific. 
The Ref. 27 recognizes that “the screening approach, which uses objective trees, offers a 
user friendly tool for determining the strengths and weaknesses of defence in depth at a 
specific plant. The top down approach has been used for the development of objective trees, 
i.e. from the objectives of each level of defence down to the challenges and mechanisms, 
and finally to the provisions. A demonstration of defence in depth in a comprehensive and 
systematic way may provide reassurance for the plant operators that their safety strategy is 
                                           
8 The Bohunice V-2 plant consists of two units equipped with WWER 440/V213 reactors. 
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sound and well balanced among the levels of defence. From a regulatory point of view, 
identification of deficiencies of defence in depth might be a valuable complement to 
traditional regulatory approaches.” 
A third comprehensive example of OPT application has been elaborated by the JAEA on the 
JSFR concept. A set of twelve trees, for the different safety functions and for the different 
levels of the DiD, has been provided within the framework of the GIF RSWG activities. The 
set is presented within the Appendix 8. 
A comprehensive OPT for a nonspecific pool type SFR is not available within the literature. 
Nevertheless, in terms of generic approach, one can consider that the example provided for 
the JSFR within the Appendix 7 of the Ref. 2 can be used as a basis for the analysis.  
Within the reference, the OPT for the third level of the DiD and for the safety function Decay 
Heat removal is given with an alternative representation which content is perfectly analogous 
to the content of the Fig 8 presented within the Appendix 8:  
 
Acceptance criteria9, challenges10 and mechanisms11 as presented within the Fig. 8 of 
Appendix 8 seem perfectly applicable to a nonspecific pool type SFR. For the JSFR a generic 
provision is identified with the following indications : “Heat transfer by passive measure 
(DHRS) (natural convection and battery-operated air-cooler dumpers)” (cf. Item 3.1.2.1.2.2) 
One can consider that the description is at least partially perfectly applicable to any pool type 
SFR: Heat transfer by passive measure (natural convection) 
4.2.1.3.2 OPT – The role of the Stratified Redan for a nonspecific pool type SFR  
If the Stratified Redan is retained as design option for the internals, its role fit perfectly with 
this description. The Stratified Redan becomes an integral part of the whole line of 
protection that, for example within the EFR, will be composed by the redan itself and the 
Direct Reactor Cooling loops (DRC)12. 
                                           
9 Acceptance criteria: adequate cooling of the fuel, vessel internals, vessel and reactor cavity by 
active/passive systems, via heat transfer to ultimate heat sinks, ensuring core geometry, and reactor 
vessel integrity 
10 Challenges : Degraded or disruption of heat transfer path 
11 Mechanisms : Long-term loss of forced convection 
12 Three passive and three active direct reactor cooling (DRC) loops for DHR.  Each of the 3 passive 
sodium circuits consists of a dip heat exchanger (DHX) suspended in the hot pool of the primary 
circuit, and a sodium/air heat exchanger (AHX). Natural circulation within the passive DRC circuits and 
nature draught on the air side minimize the dependence on safety graded emergency power supplies. 
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What it is important to retain is that the reliability of the whole Line of Protection (and so the 
input data for the PSA) would be assessed considering both the capability of the stratified 
Redan to start an effective natural convection and that of the DRC to effectively transfer the 
heat to the cold source. 
4.2.1.4 Example of application for the DPA 
As a matter of example of DPA studies, the Ref. 22 presents the feasibility studies of a 
Stratified Redan for a pool type of SFR concept. The study only covers the primary circuit of 
the reactor and is conducted along a concept whose thermal power and operating point are 
comparable to those of the European fast reactor (EFR). 
It is worth noting that, compared to the former version analyzed with the QSR (Ref. 23) and 
the PIRT (Ref. 24 & 25), despite the advantages of the Electro Magnetic Pumps (e.g. their 
compactness) and coherently with the conclusions of the QSR analysis, where a certain 
number of weaknesses where identified as directly related to the presence of the EMP (cf. 
Appendix 5), the concept analyzed by the Ref. 22 implement mechanical pumps which, at 
least partially, correct that weaknesses.  
Among the conclusions of the studies, it is worth outlining that the initial evaluations for 
detailed thermo-hydraulics are encouraging and enable the identification of control 
parameters to ensure the stratification within the Redan. It is proved that the new 
architecture simplifies the implementation of natural convection in the vessel when the 
secondary heat transport system is unavailable; it is expected that the compactness of the 
concept will allow to a more reliable (cf. § 4.2.1.3 where the whole DHR LOP reliability is 
discussed) and cheaper design. 
If the new concept with mechanical pumps is retained for future SFR – that is not the case 
for the ASTRID prototype - the QSR analysis should be re-done.  
At the same time, independently of the concept, the conclusions of the PIRT, especially 
concerning the sensitivity to the earthquake conditions, or that to vibrations (also pointed 
out by the QSR analysis), and the possible lacks in terms of knowledge needed to bring a 
robust safety demonstration, remains open and applicable. 
4.2.1.5 Example of application for the PSA 
No examples are available of a PSA applied to an architecture with the Stratified Redan.  
 
4.2.1.6 Concatenation of the ISAM tools for the Stratified Redan 
The interaction/concatenation between ISAM tools (Inputs - Outputs) is obviously not linear 
but iterative. 
For example, if one considers the logic which is behind the proposal for the Stratified Redan, 
the following steps can be identified: 
                                                                                                                                    
Under normal power operation the AHX dampers are throttled to a certain extent to keep the standby 
heat losses low. The active loops have smaller DHXs, AHXs with cooling fans and an EM pumps to 
provide forced circulation. The active loops also provide a considerable passive capability in the case 
of LOSSP.  
Diversity is further enhanced by using different types of DHX, AHX, dampers, damper drives, and 
power supplies. 
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• Building the OPT the designer identifies, for the third level of defense in depth, to 
cope with initiators / mechanisms such as "loss of sources", a passive mode for the 
evacuation of the residual heat (e.g. Fig. A8-8 of the Appendix 8); among the 
relevant provisions there will be for example exchangers in the hot collector (Decay 
heat removal (DHR) systems) with a natural convection into the primary circuit. The 
latter (the natural convection) is, in fact, a provision which is an intrinsic part of the 
line protection (LOP) which correspond to this DiD level for the DHR. 
• The Stratified Redan is a solution for the internals which allows for natural convection 
within the primary circuit and, as such, it is an integral part of LOP under 
consideration as identified by the OPT. 
• The QSR analysis of this solution highlights advantages and disadvantages, e.g. 
compared to the EFR type solution. In the exercise carried out in Ref. 23, one note 
the sensitivity to vibrations that the designer must take into account to ensure an 
acceptable concept behavior. 
• Moreover, the PIRT analysis (see Ref. 24 & 25) highlights gaps in terms of 
computational tools for earthquake behavior. 
• The DPA analysis performed in Ref. 22 show the theoretical capacity of Stratified 
Redan, concerning its physical performance potential, to achieve the requested 
missions. This analysis implicitly assumes that the problems of vibration and gaps in 
terms of response analysis to the earthquake are resolved. 
• The final analysis with the PSA considers the architecture defined by the OPT and 
must take into account the reliability of the entire line of protection, including that of 
the Stratified Redan to establish and maintain the natural convection. 
Efforts motivated by QSR analysis vis-à-vis the vibration resistance, and those motivated by 
the PIRT for the development of appropriate tools for the analysis of earthquake response 
will ensure the required reliability and therefore the robustness of the demonstration made 
by the PSA. 
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4.2.2 The case of the Japan Sodium Fast Reactor (JSFR) 
(The sections that follow include the full text of original Appendix 7 of Ref. 2 for the latter 
represents an interesting example of ISAM tools’ application to a Gen IV concept.) 
 
4.2.2.1 The JSFR plant and its design specifications 
JSFR is a loop-type sodium-cooled fast reactor: i.e., primary pumps and intermediate heat 
exchangers (IHX) constituting two loops of PHTS are installed outside the reactor vessel as 
illustrated in Fig. 9. The major design specifications are shown in Table 2. The thermal 
energy generated at the rated power of 3570MW heats up the primary coolant to 550 ºC at 
the reactor vessel outlet, then it is transferred to the secondary coolant with being heated to 
520 ºC at the two IHXs.  The main steam with temperature of 497 ºC and pressure of 19.2 
MPa is generated at the two steam generators, and it rotates the turbine generator to 
produce the electric power output of 1500MW.  
Table 2 Major design specifications of JSFR [Ref. 28] 
Power output 1500MWe/3570MWt 
Number of loops in PHTS 2 
Primary coolant temperature 550ºC/395ºC 
Primary coolant mass flow rate 1.8 ×10
4
 kg/s 
Secondary coolant temperature 520ºC/335ºC 
Main steam temperature and 
pressure 
497ºC/19.2MPa  
 
Steam
Generator
Reactor 
Vessel
Secondary
Pump
IHX
Primary Pump
 
Fig. 9 Schematic view of JSFR NSSS [Ref. 28] 
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4.2.2.2 Outline of self-actuated shutdown system (SASS) 
A self-actuated shutdown system (SASS, Ref. 29) is a passive safety feature which inserts 
control rods by the gravity force, where the detachment of the rods would be achieved by 
the coolant temperature rise under anticipated transient without scram conditions.  
The self-actuated shutdown feature of JSFR is achieved by the Curie point electromagnet 
using the temperature sensing alloy, which will lose magnetism at a predefined temperature. 
Fig. 10 shows the fundamental structure of the Curie point electromagnet SASS.  
The Curie point electromagnet SASS consists of an electromagnet and an armature. The 
control rod is held by the magnetic force formed by the electromagnet. When the 
temperature of the sensing alloy embedded in the armature part of SASS exceeds the normal 
operation level in a certain extent, the magnetic resistance of a temperature sensing alloy 
increases and then the holding force is rapidly lost due to exceeding the Curie point.  
In a reactor case, when the temperature of the sensing alloy heated up by the increase of 
the coolant temperature under the ATWS conditions, the control rods would be detached and 
be inserted into the core by gravity force without any external driving force and/or actuation 
signals.  
 
Core outlet coolant temperature rise
Sensing alloy  temperature 
reaching the Curie point
Passive de-latch due to decreasing 
magnetic force
Passive insertion of the 
rod by gravity
Coolable core geometry is 
ensured by NC-DHRS
 
Fig. 10 Outline of the Curie point electromagnet type of SASS [Ref. 30] 
 
4.2.2.3 Example of application for the QSR 
No examples are available of a QSR applied to the JSFR  
 
4.2.2.4 PIRT application result 
Table 3 shows the PIRT preliminary application result, which includes the key phenomena in 
evaluating the effectiveness of the SASS upon the ULOF accident. Comparison of the PIRT 
application results between the two different time points shows that the knowledge level of 
the key phenomena has been improved through the various experimental studies for the 
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SASS research and development (R&D). PIRT can be helpful to identify needs for a key 
experimental study if it is conducted before addressing a new R&D issue.  
Table 3 Preliminary PIRT application result by two assessors A and B 
System Component Phenomena/Characteristics/State variables
IR KL1 KL2
A B A B A B
BRSS SASS SASS actuation temperature H H 1 2 3 4 
Reactor
Upper core 
region around 
SASS
Coolant transport delay time from core outlet to around SASS H H 3 2 3 3 
Time constant of temperature response delay from coolant around 
SASS to SASS device M M 1 2 3 3 
Reactor core
Core outlet temperature of the coolant that flows to around SASS H H 3 3 3 3 
Doppler reactivity coefficient M M 4 4 4 4 
Fuel temperature reactivity coefficient L M 4 3 4 3 
Fuel cladding temperature reactivity coefficient M M 4 4 4 4 
Coolant temperature reactivity coefficient H H 4 4 4 4 
Coolant flow rate halving time H H 4 4 4 4 
Power distribution M M 4 4 4 4 
Flow rate distribution among core assemblies M M 4 4 4 4 
Coolant temperature at the core inlet and outlet L L 4 4 4 4 
Fuel pin gap heat transfer coefficient M M 4 3 4 3 
Fuel pellet thermal conductivity I I 4 4 4 4 
Thermal material property of fuel cladding and coolant I I 4 4 4 4 
RPCS Temperature I&C Coolant temperature to be used for reactor power control M L 4 4 4 4 
PHTS
Pump Pump rotating inertia M M 4 4 4 4 
- Pressure loss in the reactor and PHTS M M 4 4 4 4 
 
BRSS: Backup Reactor Shutdown System  IR: Importance ranking 
RPCS: Reactor Power Control System KL1: Knowledge level before starting SASS R&D 
PHTS: Primary Heat Transport System  KL2: Knowledge level at present 
 
4.2.2.5 Alternative representation of OPT 
OPT is usually drawn in a tree structure. Fig. 11 is an alternative representation of OPT 
developed for JSFR safety function 2 at level 3 (cf. Fig. A8-8 within the Appendix 8). This is a 
list style and compact expression. It is possible to construct and edit the tree structure 
without any specific drawing tool. 
 
 
Fig. 11 Example of a list style with unique numbering of OPT developed for JSFR safety 
function 2 at level 3 
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4.2.2.6 Details of the application of DPA and PSA to DHRS of JSFR 
The outline of DHRS in JSFR is briefly described. As shown in Fig. 12, the JSFR is equipped 
with total three trains of reactor auxiliary cooling systems for decay heat removal so that the 
decay heat can be removed only by way of the decay heat removal system. One of them is 
the DRACS that is directly connected to the reactor vessel, and the others are the PRACS 
that is connected to the PHTS. These trains are operated in a fully passive condition (i.e., 
natural circulation of sodium coolant and natural air flow at the heat sink). 
PRACS: Primary Reactor Auxiliary Cooling System
DRACS: Direct Reactor Auxiliary Cooling System
PHTS: Primary Heat Transport System
SHTS: Secondary Heat Transport System
PRACS
Steam 
Generator
DRACS
Steam
Feedwater
PRACS
Steam
Steam 
Generator
Feedwater
PHTSSHTS SHTS
 
Fig. 12 Outline of decay heat removal system (DHRS) 
DPA and PSA were conducted in a parallel way. In order both to determine postulated 
scenarios in DPA and to develop event trees in PSA, initiating events were identified and 
categorized, based on the plant design information and using master logic diagram method. 
The categorized initiating events are shown in Table 4.  
 
Table 4 Categorization of initiating events for DHRS analysis 
ID Description Examples 1 PRACS DRACS
Electric 
power 
system
IC01 Reactor shutdown with all DHRS functions available Positive reactivity insertion ○ ○ ○
IC02 Loss of forced circulation in one PHTS or SHTS Primary pump stick ○ ○ ○
IC03 Sodium leakage inside the guard pipes/guard vessels in one PHTS
Sodium leakage inside the 
guard pipe in PHTS piping △ ○ ○
IC04 Loss of circulation capability in DRACS
Sodium leakage within the 
enclosure in DRACS piping ○ × ○
IC05 Loss of off-site power Loss of off-site power ○ ○ △
IC06 Loss of main feedwater/steam line Feedwater pump failure ○ ○ ○
IC07 Loss of circulation capability in one PRACS
Sodium leakage within the 
enclosure in PRACS piping × ○ ○
 
○: The initiating event does not affect the safety system. 
△: The initiating event results in loss of redundancy in the safety system. 
×: The initiating event results in complete loss of the safety system function. 
     Some accident management might be affected by IC02 and IC06. 
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Then the mitigation systems were defined and the event trees were developed as shown in 
Fig. 14, based on the plant design specifications linked with the key information that was 
obtained from the OPTs.  
The reactor scram followed by the DHRS operation was selected as the postulated scenario. 
Systems and components available were determined, corresponding to the successful 
accident sequence that was developed in the event trees. DPA was conducted by using the 
plant model shown in Fig. 13. And then the end state in Fig. 14, whether core integrity is 
maintained or not, was determined based on the DPA results.  
pipe
DHX
RV upper 
plenum
H/L pipe IHX inlet 
plenum
IHX
PHTS 
Pump & 
outlet
IHX
outlet
plenum
IHX inlet 
plenum
C/L pipeRV lower 
plenum
Core
IHX 
outlet 
plenum
C/L pipe
C/L pipe
H/L pipe
SG
PHX
SG inlet 
plenum
SG
outlet 
plenum
A/C
【RV】
【DRACS】 【PRACS(A)】
A/C
Loop B
【SG】
SHTS
pump
【 Integrated Pump and IHX 】
Loop B
pipe pipe pipe
 
Fig. 13 Example of the plant model for DPA of JSFR DHRS 
 
Loss of
circulation
capability in
PRACS-B
Reactor
SCRAM
Passive
cooling by
using
PRACS-A *
Passive
cooling by
using
DRACS *
IC07-B RS ANC DNC Before DPA After DPA
Success 
↑
Failure 
↓
OK
Damage
Damage
Damage
-
Core
 integritySeq.No. Accident sequence
1 /RS*/ANC*/DNC(Successful DBA scenario) Should be OK 
(1)
/RS*/ANC*DNC
(Passive cooling by using PRACS-A alone) Unknown 
(1)
3 /RS*ANC*/DNC(Passive cooling by using DRACS alone) Unknown 
(1)
(1) Need to be confirmed by DPA
*; This cooling mode relies only on the safety-related systems.
2
This sequence is developed in
detail in other event trees 5 - -
4 /RS*ANC*DNC(Loss of all heat sink) Damage
 
Fig. 14 Typical event tree model in the JSFR Level-1 PSA 
 
Based on consideration of the JSFR PSA result, the designer/analyst examined possibility of 
introducing non-safety-related blowers at the air cooler inlet to enhance PRACS and DRACS 
capability with considering both less cost increase and significant safety improvement as 
shown in Fig. 15.  
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PRACS: Primary Reactor Auxiliary Cooling System
DRACS: Direct Reactor Auxiliary Cooling System
PHTS: Primary Heat Transport System
SHTS: Secondary Heat Transport System
PRACS
Steam 
Generator
DRACS
Steam
Feedwater
PRACS
Steam
Steam 
Generator
Feedwater
PHTSSHTS SHTS
M M M
 
Fig. 15 Design improvement by introducing non-safety-related blowers at the air cooler inlet 
to enhance PRACS and DRACS capability 
 
After additional DPA, it was confirmed that the consequence of the decay heat removal 
scenario with sodium natural circulation and forced-air flow by using DRACS alone becomes 
maintaining the reactor coolant boundary integrity as shown in Fig. 16. The event tree was 
then updated as shown in Fig. 17 by considering this design improvement.  The updated PSA 
result shows quantitatively that introduction of the air cooler blowers in both PRACS and 
DRACS can reduce significantly the PLOHS frequency; i.e., improve the reliability of decay 
heat removal (see in detail Fig. 18). 
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Fig. 16 Additional DPA result: Forced-air flow with blower and sodium natural circulation 
cooling scenario by using DRACS alone 
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Loss of
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PRACS-B
Reactor
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cooling by
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PRACS-A *
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DRACS *
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flow cooling
by using
PRACS-A **
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Success ↑
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*; This cooling mode relies only on the safety-related systems.
**; This cooling mode relies not only on the safety-related systems but also on automatic actuation of the non-safety-related systems (i.e., air
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This sequence is developed in detail in other event trees
6 ANC*DNC(Loss of all heat sink) Damage
7 - -
4 ANC*/DNC*/DFC(Forced air flow cooling by using DRACS alone) OK
5 ANC*/DNC*DFC(Passive cooling by using DRACS alone) Damage
2 /ANC*DNC*/AFC(Forced air flow cooling by using PRACS-A alone) OK
3 /ANC*DNC*AFC(Passive cooling by using PRACS-A alone) Damage
Seq.
No. Accident sequence
Core
 integrity
1 /ANC*/DNC(Successful DBA scenario) OK
 
 
Fig. 17 DHRS event tree model considering air cooler blower operation 
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Seq. 2
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Seq. 3
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15%
Seq. 5
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Seq. 6
1%
The others
1%
PLOHS
9x10-9/ry
Seq. 1 Loss of passive cooling function in 2 loops &
failure to start AC blower in the other loop
Seq. 2 Loss of all electric power & human error in manual 
damper operation
Seq. 3 Loss of passive cooling function in 3 loops (after 
24h)
Seq. 4 Common cause failure of PRACS dampers & 
failure to start AC blower in DRACS
Seq. 5 Common cause failure of PRACS dampers & loss 
of active cooling function in DRACS AC
Seq. 6 Na leakage in one loop of DHRS & DHRS 
actuation signal failure in one loop & human error 
in manual damper operation & failure to start AC 
blower in the other loop
*; ordered by contribution
 
 
Fig. 18 PSA result: Major contributors to PLOHS frequency broken down by combination of 
loss of mitigation systems 
 
 
36 
Guidance Document for Integrated Safety Assessment Methodology 
 
4.2.3 Summary of the ISAM Tools concatenation 
Fig. 19 shows succinctly the concatenation in terms of inputs /outputs between the 
different ISAM tools to achieve the safety demonstration. 
Important 
Phenomena
Provisions
Architecture
Adequacy of tools for
the safety demonstration
(which must be guaranteed)
Safety Analysis/
Demonstration
Assessment/
Compliance
QSR PIRT
OPT
DPA
PSA
Safety Requirements
and specifications
Advantages
and Drawbacks
to be corrected
Analysis
of transients
Plant Process
 
Fig. 19– Concatenation between the ISAM Tools 
 
5 Conclusions 
A key objective of the Generation IV (Gen IV) International Forum’s Risk and Safety Working 
Group charter is the development and the qualification of an integrated methodology that 
can be used to evaluate and document the safety of Gen IV nuclear systems.  
Coherently with its mandate, RSWG prepared and delivered in 2011 a document that 
describes the Integrated Safety Assessment Methodology (ISAM), for use throughout the 
Gen IV technology development cycle. 
The methodology has been presented to the different Gen IV System Steering Committees 
during a specific workshop organized in April 2010 in JRC/Petten. Following the workshop 
comments and suggestions were collected.  
Among these comments and suggestions there are the explicit need for having a more 
detailed description/justification about the "integration" of the different ISAM tools, as well 
as the request for further practical guidelines for its application. 
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To answer this request as part of facilitating the use of the methodology, the RSWG 
identified the need to develop a supporting Guidance Document for ISAM (GDI) to provide 
the users with further help for the ISAM implementation. 
This DGI was developed to meet the  following objectives: : 
1) To provide a step-by-step description on how to apply ISAM: 
a) to identify the inputs and outputs of the different tools; 
b) to explain the flow from one step to another; 
c) to elaborate a flow chart in support. 
2) To illustrate a pilot application of ISAM to a specific system or part of system as an 
example. 
The following topics were addressed by the GDI document: 
• The proof of consistency/adequacy between on one side the ISAM tools and structure 
and, on the other side, the current requirements and recommendations applicable to 
future nuclear systems;  
• A summary of ISAM describing, for the different tools, 
o the inputs and outputs; 
o their mutual dependencies. 
• The precise definition of the possible role and contribution of each ISAM tool versus 
the different plant design status (pre-conceptual, conceptual, final; i.e. the step-by-
step application of ISAM). It is proposed that either the single case of a given design 
status (e.g. conceptual design) is considered with the application of the five tools or 
several distinctive combinations of some of the five tools are analysed. 
In this paper the different ISAM tools are discussed singularly and globally to outline their 
respective role within the context of the whole design and assessment process. Flowchart for 
their concatenation is provided. 
Specific studies were performed in parallel (on QSR, the OPT / LOP, the whole ISAM), to 
reinforce the relevance of both singular tools and methodology as a whole, vis-à-vis of 
available and applicable recommendations for future reactors. 
Examples of applications are presented; they treat both the case of completely innovative 
concepts that are proposed for integration into future concepts (e.g. the stratified Redan for 
future pool type SFR, analyzed with the QSR, the PIRT, the OPT and the DPA) or systems 
already integrated into projects fourth generation (JSFR with overall OPT, the JSFR Self 
Actuated Shut Down Systems (SSAS) with the PIRT, the Decay Heat Removal Systems JSFR 
(DHRS) with the DPA and the PSA). 
All these examples should convince the designers about the relevance and usefulness of the 
ISAM method and its tools to help make up the design and the assessment of systems or 
components, as well as overall architectures, for fourth generation systems. 
 
38 
Guidance Document for Integrated Safety Assessment Methodology 
 
6 References 
1) GIF/RSWG/2007/002 – Basis for the Safety Approach for Design & Assessment of 
Generation IV Nuclear Systems; Revision 1 November 24, 2008 
2) GIF/RSWG/2010/002/Rev.1 – An Integrated Safety Assessment Methodology (ISAM) 
for Generation IV Nuclear Systems; June 2011 
3) G. L. Fiorini, A guidance document for Integrated Safety Assessment Methodology for 
use throughout the Gen IV technology development cycle, Service Contract N° 
JRC.BXL.C1 82040, Brussels, 2010 
4) IAEA, Safety Assessment and Verification for Nuclear Power Plants; Safety Guide No. 
NS-G-1.2 ; Vienna 2001 
5) IAEA, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design ; Specific Safety Requirements No. SSR-
2.1 ; Vienna 2012 
6) G.L. Fiorini; N. Hakimi; B. Tombuyses; C. Dams, A. Wertelaers, M. Schrauben, R. 
Dresselaers: The Design Options and Provision File and the role of the defence in 
depth within the pre-licensing of the MYRRHA project. International Conference on 
Topical Issues in Nuclear Installation Safety: Defence in Depth — Advances and 
Challenges for Nuclear Installation Safety; IAEA Headquarters, Vienna, Austria 21–24 
October 2013 
7) IAEA, Fundamental Safety Principles Series No. SF-1, 2006 
8) Safety of new NPP designs Study by WENRA Reactor Harmonization Working Group; 
October 2012 – Draft N°9 
9) WENRA Statement on Safety Objectives for New Nuclear Plants; November 2010 
10) IAEA – The safety of Nuclear Installation Safety series N°110 
11) IAEA-TECDOC-682, Objectives for the development of advanced nuclear plants 
12) IAEA-TECDOC-626, Safety related terms for advanced nuclear plants 
13) IAEA-TECDOC-1624, Passive Safety Systems and Natural Circulation in Water Cooled 
Nuclear Power Plants, November 2009 
14) IAEA Safety Glossary, Terminology Used in Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection, 
2007 Edition 
15) IAEA-NS-R4  Safety of Research Reactors; 2005 
16) WENRA Reactor Safety Reference Levels January (2008) 
17) International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO): 
Guidance for the Application of an Assessment Methodology for Innovative Nuclear 
Energy Systems INPRO Manual — Overview of the Methodology  
IAEA-TECDOC-1575 Rev. 1 – November 2008 
18) G.L.Fiorini: Analysis of the INPRO methodology concerning the safety assessment. 
Critical comparison with the status of the RSWG requirements and tool (QSR) - 
Crosscut and direct comparison; RSWG - QSR / INPRO – 08/10/09 
19) G.L.Fiorini: Analysis of the IAEA NSSR-2/1document concerning the Safety of Nuclear 
Power Plants: Design. Critical comparison with the status of the RSWG-Qualitative 
Safety Review (QSR) set of criteria - Crosscut and direct comparison; RSWG - QSR / 
NSSR 2-1 – 08/10/2012  
39 
Guidance Document for Integrated Safety Assessment Methodology 
 
20) L. Ammirabile, European project SARGEN_IV: safety approach and assessment of GEN 
IV reactors, 3rd Joint GIF-IAEA Workshop on Safety Design Criteria for Sodium-Cooled 
Fast Reactors, Vienna, Feb 2013 
21) Tim Leahy Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) as an Element of the Gen IV ISAM - 
RSWG/SSC Workshop 12-13 April 2010 Petten, NETHERLANDS 
22) Guy-Marie Gautier & Al  : SFR innovative design: the Stratified Redan Concept ;; CEA, 
DEN, DER, CEN Cadarache Proceedings of ICAPP 2011 Nice, France, May 2-5, 2011 
Paper 11165 
23) G.L.Fiorini: Applicability of the RSWG/ISAM to an SFR Innovative Concept: the 
Stratified REDAN - Qualitative Safety Review (ISAM/QSR);  
CEA/DEN/CAD/DER/SESI/DIR/NT DO 8 13/12/10 Indice 0 
24) G.L.Fiorini: Applicability of the RSWG/ISAM to an SFR Innovative Concept: the 
Stratified REDAN Phenomena Identification Ranking Table (ISAM/PIRT); 1a – Three 
case studies - CEA/DEN/CAD/DER/SESI/DIR/NT DO 09; 13/12/10 Indice 0 
25) G.L.Fiorini: Applicability of the RSWG/ISAM to an SFR Innovative Concept: the 
Stratified REDAN Phenomena Identification Ranking Table (ISAM/PIRT); 1b – One case 
study - CEA/DEN/CAD/DER/SESI/DIR/NT DO 10; 13/12/10 Indice 0 
26) Considerations in the development of safety requirements for innovative reactors: 
Application to modular high temperature gas cooled reactors; IAEA Tecdoc 1366 
August 2003 
27) Assessment of Defence in Depth for Nuclear Power Plants; IAEA Safety Report Series 
No. 46 ; February 2005 
28) Shoji Kotake, et al., “Development of Advanced Loop-Type Fast Reactor in Japan(1): 
Current Status of JSFR Development”, paper 8226, Proceedings of ICAPP ’08, Anaheim, 
CA USA, June 8-12, 2008. 
29) Shigeyuki Nakanishi, et al., “Development of Advanced Loop-Type Fast Reactor in 
Japan (5): Adoption of Self-Actuated Shutdown System to JSFR”, paper 8224, 
Proceedings of ICAPP ’08, Anaheim, CA USA, June 8-12, 2008. 
30) Ichimiya et al., “A Next Generation Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactor Concept and its R&D 
Program,” Nucl. Eng. Technol., 39(3), 171-186(2007). 
31) WENRA Safety of New NPP designs (2013) 
 
 
 
40 
Guidance Document for Integrated Safety Assessment Methodology 
 
41 
Guidance Document for Integrated Safety Assessment Methodology 
 
Appendix 1 : The glossary of the flowchart (cf. Fig. 2) 
N.B. Terms are presented in alphabetical order 
 
Challenges 
Following the definition of GIF RSWG (Ref. 2), Challenges are “generalized mechanisms, 
processes or circumstances (conditions) that may impact the intended performance of safety 
functions; a set of which mechanisms have consequences which are similar in nature”. 
 
Controlled state 
Cf. Ref. 5: “Plant state, following an anticipated operational occurrence or accident 
conditions, in which the fundamental safety functions can be ensured and which can be 
maintained for a time sufficient to implement provisions to reach a safe state.” 
 
SSCs Design Criteria 
SSCs design criteria (or decoupling criteria) are physical parameters (e.g. number of clad 
failures) which make the link between the safety objectives, which are formulated in quite 
generic manner (e.g. health consequences  corresponding releases), and quantitative and 
measurable objectives or acceptance criteria (e.g. maximum clad temperature) which are 
usable by the designer to check the acceptability of the design. Moreover, through the 
assessment process, they allow defining measurable safety margins. 
 
Design and Operational Safety Specifications 
Two types of specifications can be considered under this term. 
First those “technical” related to the design, which are imposed by the need to execute the 
tasks requested to ensure the achievement of safety functions and the compliance with 
safety objectives. These design specifications are essential for the design and sizing of the 
provisions of the safety architecture; these design specifications relate to both physical 
performances and reliability requested in cases of solicitation.  
On the other side, the “operational specifications” which require the compliance with specific 
rules for operation as well as for In Service Inspection and Repair and maintenance, and that 
ensure that the plant is kept its design domain. 
 
Mechanism 
Following the definition of GIF RSWG (Ref. 2), mechanisms are “Specific reasons, processes 
or situations whose consequences might create challenges to the performance of safety 
functions”. Versus the safety functions, the mechanism(s) materialize the challenge. 
 
Mission 
The safety mission is the set of actions achieved by the safety architecture and its provisions 
(including procedures) to bring the plant into a controlled state. 
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Provisions 
The term “Provision” is generic; it is used to indicate a specific feature which is an integral 
part of the safety architecture.   
Prevention, control and mitigation of incident and accidents are managed by technical 
provisions and/or organizational measures (i.e. the safety architecture, the security 
architecture). Technical safety provisions include: structures (buildings, concrete shell, skates 
earthquake, etc.), active and/or passive systems (cooling, control/surveillance, detection, 
alarm, etc..), components (pumps, pools, valves, etc.) which can be grouped under the term 
"systems, structures and components” (SSCs). Technical safety provisions also include the 
physical characteristics such as the counter reactions, the thermal inertia, etc.  
The operational provisions include: operating rules; technical specifications; in-service 
inspection; normal, incident and accident procedures; the organization of crisis intervention.  
As indicated above all these provisions have to be designed and set up within the safety 
architecture.  
 
Safety Architecture 
The notion of "Final design" (cf. Fig. 4) is, in practice, the establishment of a “safety 
architecture” for the installation. The latter surrounds the process which is set up to carry 
out the missions of the installation (e.g. energy production).  
The safety architecture shall allow getting close to the safety goals, ensuring that safety 
objectives are met in all plausible plant’s conditions: normal, abnormal, accidental. Within 
the context of this document the notion of safety architecture should be considered generic; 
in practice it is characterized by all the "technical provisions" (including inherent physical 
characteristics) and organizational measures for the design, the construction, the operation, 
the shutdown and the decommissioning of a facility, taken to prevent abnormal or degraded 
situations or limit their effects.  
Following this definition, any "technical or organizational provision" involved in the realization 
of the safety is an integral part of this architecture.  So this notion of "safety architecture" 
aims at:  
• assisting  in the identification of all the provisions that contribute to make and keep 
the facility “safe” (i.e. the plant into a controlled state) and therefore to control the 
risk; 
• facilitating the design and sizing of the provisions by including in their specifications 
both functional goals, objectives and reliability constraints generated by any other 
provisions of the environment, in which they are required to achieve their mission.  
 
Safety Goals  
The safety goals for the GEN IV systems are defined by the Technology Roadmap (Ref. 8) 
and the designer should use these goals to define Safety Objectives and to justify the priority 
given to certain subjects of R & D that support the design. 
Indeed, the goals are defined (cf. Ref.1):“to be used to stimulate the search for innovative 
nuclear energy systems both for the reactors and the fuel cycle installations and it will serve 
to motivate and guide the R&D on Generation IV systems as collaborative efforts get 
underway.”  
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Safety Guidelines 
The setting of the design is also accompanied by the choice by the designer of guidelines 
that underlines the design process. Among the nuclear safety standards, the IAEA safety 
guides shall be considered as the first options when compared to alternative guidance 
documents (e.g. Ref. 4); they provide recommendations and guidance on how to comply 
with the IAEA safety requirements, indicating an international consensus on the measures 
recommended. In that context, general and specific IAEA safety guides standards shall be 
considered by the designer as the first option when compared to alternative guidance, taking 
into account the specificity of installation under consideration.  
Other complementary guidelines can be selected if they reflect best practices used by the 
nuclear technology and / or are supported by a significant feedback experience. 
 
Safety Objectives  
Starting from the "Goals", and the minimum safety objectives (e.g. WENRA, Ref. 9), the 
designer defines the "Safety objectives" that shall be achieved by the “final design” of the 
installation. The translation of the goals into the objectives adopted for the design, starts 
from the Fundamental Safety Objective indicated by the IAEA, as well as by the two corollary 
objectives concerning Radiation Protection Objective and Technical Safety Objective (Ref. 
10). 
In general the safety objectives are defined in a relative manner comparing to what is 
achieved, for example, by the installations in operation. Other complementary objectives can 
be defined by the designer if considered necessary13, both to inform the design and / or to 
make the safety approach more explicit / efficient.  
For the purpose of the design, it is necessary to break down the qualitative safety objectives 
into quantitative safety objectives and technical criteria (decoupling criteria) so that the 
designer can verify that they are achieved. For that it is important to quantify these criteria 
for example by indicating a specific link with the basic safety functions (reactivity control, 
energy removal, confinement) and /or, if necessary, with sub-functions.  
Moreover considering the installation conditions (normal, incidental, accidental) specific 
targets should be defined for each these conditions, for example for the different levels of 
the defense in depth (e.g. using a Farmer curve). 
 
Safety Options 
The selection of provisions to build the safety architecture is not necessarily a unique 
process: several design solutions are often available, all of which are formally able to achieve 
the safety objectives.  
In these conditions, other criteria may be considered by the designer to select the right 
provisions such as the economy, ease of operation or maintenance, availability or absence of 
a significant feedback experience, etc.. One can note that these criteria should not 
necessarily be the same for the entire installation, each provision or group of provisions may 
justify the selection of specific safety options.  
Thus the simultaneous consideration, on one side, of the safety objectives and principles and 
guidelines and, on the other hand, of these other additional criteria, lead to the definition of 
"safety options" for the selection and the detailed organization of provisions that build up the 
                                           
13 For example to improve the robustness of the demonstration 
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safety architecture. For example, the selection between active or passive operation, static 
and dynamic behaviour of a barrier, the degree of easiness and ability to repair or replace a 
defective component, are all “design safety options” that the designer should define before 
selecting and sizing the provision(s) which will realize the safety function.  
Once more it is worth noting that the “design safety option” is not the implemented solution 
itself but the way (i.e. the design strategy) to perform the mission required to meet the 
objective(s) of the safety function(s); it affects the search, the selection and the sizing of the 
provision(s) that materialize the implemented solution and achieve the requested mission.  
The justification that these options allow getting close to the safety goals and meeting the 
safety objectives shall be presented. The available design basis documentation and 
knowledge, the R&D topics which are under assessment as well as the open safety issues, 
should also be addressed to justify the selected safety options. 
 
Safety Principles  
The setting of objectives for the design is accompanied by the choice by the designer, of 
principles that underlines the design process. Ten fundamental and mandatory safety 
principles are defined within the Ref.7. Other complementary principles (see Appendix 2) can 
be selected by the designer to provide the needed inputs to define the safety options, e.g.: 
1. Performing the safety functions incorporating into the design an appropriate 
combination of inherent safety features, safety systems and engineered safety 
features active and passive 
2. Defense in depth for accident prevention, control and mitigation 
3. Risk-Informed Design, Simulation and Prototyping 
4. Etc. 
 
Safety Requirements 
Safety requirements define the elements necessary to ensure nuclear safety (e.g. Ref. 5 and 
Appendix 3); they are applicable to the safety functions and to the associated provisions: 
structures, systems and components, as well as to procedures important to the safety of the 
installation. 
Safety requirements address design and operation of the installation and are needed to 
define safety options. 
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Appendix 2 : Safety design principles 
The fundamental principles presented within the Ref. 7; they address the following themes : 
• Principle 1: Responsibility for safety  
• Principle 2: Role of government  
• Principle 3: Leadership and management for safety  
• Principle 4: Justification of facilities and activities  
• Principle 5: Optimization of protection  
• Principle 6: Limitation of risks to individuals  
• Principle 7: Protection of present and future generations 
• Principle 8: Prevention of accidents  
• Principle 9: Emergency preparedness and response  
• Principle 10: Protective actions to reduce existing or unregulated radiation risks  
Beside these principles a non-exhaustive list of specific safety principles felt to be particularly 
relevant for design are presented next. 
1) Taking advantage of inherent safety characteristics, utilizing passive safety 
systems  
• Inherent safety characteristics: Referring to Ref. 11, an inherent safety characteristic 
provides assurance of the elimination of a potential internal hazard to the safety of the 
nuclear plant. Hence, the plant design should seek to take maximum, feasible advantage 
of inherent safety characteristics through selection of materials, their quantity, their 
physical properties and their configuration in the plant design, to the extent that these 
characteristics have been proven to provide enhanced safety. Providing, for example, 
negative reactivity insertion to assure shutdown, through adequate core negative 
reactivity effect, appears to be a function amenable to the use of inherent safety 
characteristic. 
• Passive safety system: Throughout the IAEA publications, different definitions of 
passive systems can be found. Referring to Ref. 12 a passive safety system provides a 
safety related function without reliance on operator action and on external mechanical 
and/or electrical power, signals or applied forces. A passive safety system, when 
initiated, relies instead on natural forces such as natural convection, heat conduction and 
heat radiation, on inherent safety characteristics and on internally stored energy.  
Referring to appendix A of Ref. 12 and Ref. 13,  there exist different levels of 
passiveness for the design of safety systems depending on the startup mechanism of the 
system and/or the physical processes involved in its operation (e.g. inherent safety by 
negative reactivity feedback from the transient is an example of the highest level of 
passiveness)14. 
More simply, referring to the IAEA safety glossary (Ref. 14), a passive component is a 
component whose functioning does not depend on an external input such as actuation, 
mechanical movement or supply of power.  
Regardless of the definition adopted for passive systems or their classification, the 
reliability of any passive system, active system or combined passive/active system should 
be evaluated.  
Efforts should be made to utilize reliable passive safety systems in the plant, especially 
for accidental conditions. Providing, for example, adequate rate and magnitude of 
negative reactivity insertion to assure shutdown and providing adequate thermal inertia 
and/or the possibility for natural convection to limit temperatures of the fuel, 
components, systems and structures appear to be functions amenable to the use of 
passive systems. 
                                           
14 In practice this classification is no longer used. 
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2) Performing the safety functions 
Referring to Ref. 15, the three basic safety functions — essentially, controlling the core 
reactivity, cooling in particular the reactor core and the spent fuel, and confining radioactive 
material — shall be met by incorporating into the design an appropriate combination of 
inherent safety features, safety systems and engineered safety features active and passive, 
the objective being to be successful in efficiency, reliability15 and availability. 
3) Defense in depth for accident prevention, control and mitigation 
Defense in depth is the primary means to address the fundamental safety principles 5 to 9 
(Optimization of protection; Limitation of risks to individuals; Protection of present and future 
generations; Prevention of accidents; & Emergency preparedness and response) (cf. Ref. 7), 
i.e. the primary means of preventing, controlling and mitigating the consequences of 
accidents. Defense in depth is implemented primarily through the combination of a number 
of consecutive and independent levels of protection that would have to fail before harmful 
effects could be caused to people or to the environment. If one level of protection or barrier 
were to fail, the subsequent level or barrier would be available. When properly implemented, 
defense in depth ensures that no single technical, human or organizational failure could lead 
to harmful effects, and that the combinations of failures that could give rise to significant 
harmful effects are of very low probability. The effectiveness of the independency between 
the different levels16 of defense is a necessary element of defense in depth.  
As far as the design is concerned, defense in depth is provided by an appropriate 
combination of: 
• The incorporation of good design and engineering features which provide safety margins, 
diversity and redundancy, mainly by the use of: 
o Design, technology and materials of high quality and reliability; 
o Control, limiting and protection systems and surveillance features; 
o An appropriate combination of inherent and engineered safety features (active and / 
or passive). 
• An effective management system with a strong management commitment to safety and 
a strong safety culture for all the actors throughout the whole life of the installation 
(design, construction, operation and dismantling).  
• An adequate site selection to minimize the risk for external hazards 
As stated in Ref.1, the emphasis should be on prevention backed up by mitigation, meaning 
that the focusing should be on principles that “will result in further improvements in 
reactor safety rather than on achieving a significant reduction in a  selected fundamental 
risk metric. For example, it may be more desirable to effectively eliminate accident 
sequences that might have the potential for offsite releases of radionuclides than it is to 
make substantial improvements in containment performance.” 
4) Risk-Informed Design, Simulation and Prototyping 
Risk-Informed17 Design, Simulation, Prototyping are principles more and more referred to 
and taken on board as principles in the design the reactors of the future (Ref.1) 
                                           
15 The correct assessment of efficiency and reliability of implemented measures is a key issue to 
justify the selection of design options and corresponding provisions. This applies to all sort of 
provisions, namely the inherent characteristics, as well as to active or passive engineered systems. 
16 The failure of a given level of the DiD, i.e. the failure of the corresponding provisions, does not 
affect the efficiency and the reliability of the following level.  
17 Risk Informed design, i.e.: deterministic approach complemented by probabilistic methods. 
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Appendix 3 - Safety requirements  
Requirements for nuclear safety are intended to ensure the highest level of safety that can 
reasonably be achieved for the protection of operators, the public and the environment from 
harmful effects of ionizing radiation arising from nuclear installations.  
The considered requirements should translate: 
• the fundamental safety principles in order to take into account the needs for 
management of the safety concerns during the design and the operation of the 
facility,  
• the technical concerns to design the provisions needed to guarantee the achievement 
of the safety functions,  
• the needs to insure the adequate level of safety during the whole lifetime of the 
installation,  
• the human factor,  
• etc.   
The designer shall provide the documentation sources for the design requirements with due 
consideration of the IAEA publications (e.g. the references Ref. 5 & 15). The IAEA standards 
establish requirements that must be met to ensure the protection of people and the 
environment. The extent of their application and any additional safety measures that may 
need to be taken, are required to be proposed by the operating organization and submitted 
for approval to the regulatory authority.  
Without being prescriptive and exhaustive, other sources can provide interesting insights to 
organize the framework which allow defining the detail of design requirements; among 
others: 
• The GIF publications (e.g. Ref. 1); 
• The WENRA publications (e.g. Ref. 16, …)18 
• The INPRO publications (e.g. Ref. 17). 
 
                                           
18 The reference levels developed by WENRA for the existing reactors are recognized as widely 
applicable also to new reactors. However, as pointed out by WENRA (Ref. WENRA - Safety Objectives 
for New Power Reactors – December 2009), “as the practicability of safety improvements at design 
stage is greater than that for an operating plant, more stringent application of several of the reference 
levels is expected for new reactors”. In addition WENRA recognizes that “there is room for safety 
improvements that go beyond the intent of the reference levels for existing reactors and which reflect 
the use of state-of-the art methodologies and techniques and the results of safety research”. 
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Appendix 4 : Example of application of the flowchart (cf. Fig. 2) for the  
Selection and design of the reactivity control system 
 
Safety Goals 
The GIF goal Safety and Reliability 2 apply (Very low 
likelihood and degree of reactor core damage).
Safety Objectives 
The IAEA objectives as well as the WENRA 
objectives O1 and O2 are applicable.  
Design & operational safety specifications
applicable to the selected provisions
Avoid the injection of a given energy  (j/g)
within the fuel element (as a function of the fuel design)
Safety Options 
Selection of the nature of the normal 
operation reactivity control system, e.g. 
solid control rods
Design and sizing of Provisions : 
the control rods will have limited worth ∆ρ* and 
their movement  will be limited by an overrunning 
clutch  and by the limiters (v<v*) 
 Build up of the Safety Architecture
the provision described above are  integral part 
of the 1st level of the DiD
Safety Principles : e.g. : IAEA NSF1 Principle 8, N°3.30
Requirements : e.g. : IAEA NSR1 requirement N°6.3
Guidelines : e.g. IAEA NS-G-1.3 Instrumentation and 
Control Systems Important to Safety in Nuclear Power 
Plants
Decoupling criteria
Avoid or limit the number of clad failures
Avoid or limit core melting to less than  X%
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Fig. A4-1 : Design and the implementation of the safety  architecture  
Selection and design of the reactivity control system 
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Appendix 5 – The concept of “stratified REDAN” (Ref. 22) 
In the framework of the prospective studies of the Sodium Fast Reactor (SFR) for GEN4, CEA 
examines the feasibility of a new architecture of pool type reactor. The main objectives of 
this new design are an improvement of hydraulic path of the natural convection for the 
decay heat removal and a better compactness versus the standard pool type SFR. This 
design consists in a new solution to separate the hot plenum from the cold one.  
In a standard design, both plenums are separated by one or two walls with generally a 
cylindrical-conical shape, called “redan”. To look for a maximum convective efficiency, there 
should be leak tightness between components (intermediate heat exchanger (IHX) and 
pumps) and the redan. Sealing is necessary to prevent a bypass of primary sodium from the 
hot plenum directly to the cold plenum without flow through the IHX. 
The innovative solution consists in a separation between both plenums by two non-leak-
proof horizontal walls. Components cross these walls without seal. The sodium convection in 
the reactor is performed by two groups of pumps with variable speed in hydraulic series: one 
for the core from the cold plenum to the hot plenum, and one for the IHX from the hot 
plenum to the cold one (Ref. 22). The hydraulic leak tightness between the two walls is done 
by an optimized flow control in the pumps. Since there is no flow crossing the two horizontal 
walls, there is sodium stratification in the volume delimited by these two walls. These walls 
having the same function as the redan of the standard pool type reactor, the new design is 
named “Stratified Redan”. 
 
Pieds assemblage
Centre  
coeur
sommier
Platelage
PEM
IHX
EMP for 
the IHX
EPM 
for the core
Two plates to 
organize and 
keep the 
sodium 
stratification 
Decay heat removal
IHX
BCC
Hot 
collector
Cold 
collector
Input Output of 
secondary sodium
Reactor roof
Thermocouple 
poole
 
Fig. A5-1 – Stratified REDAN  
Forced convection path (blue lines) and natural convection path (red lines)  
Artistic view of the version with Electro Magnetic Pumps (EMP) 
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Appendix 6 – Excerpt of the ISAM/QSR analysis of the “stratified REDAN”  
TABLE 1 
CLASS 3 : Detailed & Technology neutral recommendations applicable to a given safety function 
Requirements applicable to the decay heat removal (DHR) safety function – Analysis of the concept with the “Stratified REDAN” 
 
Qualitative 
assessment Comments 
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1. 1st level :  PREVENTION : Prevention of abnormal operation and 
failures    
 
1.1. Work out and set up a simple design for the operation and safety 
behaviour and safety behaviour     
 
1.1.1. Work out and set up a simple neutronic design     
1.1.2. Work out and set up a simple thermo hydraulic design     
1.1.2.1. Simplify the thermo hydraulic for the normal 
operating conditions (heat removal at nominal 
operating conditions and during nominal 
operational transients)  
  X 
The thermo hydraulic behaviour of the primary circuit will be more 
complex due to the needed specific EMP regulation to guarantee the 
stable stratification within the internal volume of the REDAN 
1.1.2.2. Simplify the thermo hydraulic for the normal DHR  X  As for the EFR. The DHR loop through the IHX is quite conventional. 
1.1.2.3. Simplify the thermo hydraulic for the safety DHR X   The hydraulic loop to establish and maintain the natural convection is 
significantly simplified  
1.1.2.4. Separate the normal operating DHR function from 
the safety DHR  X  
As for the EFR 
1.1.2.5. Increase the range covered by the functionally 
redundant DHR systems (forced convection > 
natural convection) X   
The overlapping between normal heat removal (forced convection 
through the IHX and DRACS) and the heat removal during abnormal 
conditions (natural convection) is achieved gradually and without sharp 
modifications of the hydraulic path. 
1.1.2.6. Minimize the number of components per system   X Significant number of EMPs installed on the IHX  
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TABLE 1 
CLASS 3 : Detailed & Technology neutral recommendations applicable to a given safety function 
Requirements applicable to the decay heat removal (DHR) safety function – Analysis of the concept with the “Stratified REDAN” 
 
Qualitative 
assessment Comments 
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1.1.3. Work out and set up a simple thermo-mechanic design     
1.1.3.1. Simplify the primary vessel internals from 
mechanical point of view     
 
1.1.3.1.1. Leaktightness X   No need for mechanical leaktightness between the hot collector and the 
cold collector. 
1.1.3.1.2. Corrosion  X  As for the EFR 
1.1.3.1.3. Defaults and Cracks propagation  
X   
Likely favourable due to the lower stress/strain fields on the REDAN 
structures, but certainly favourable for the racks propagation will not 
significantly affect the functional behaviour.  
1.1.3.1.4. Vibrations 
  X 
The large REDAN structures are exposed to the risk of vibrations. The 
design of these structures has to address the risk of vibrations for all the 
plausible conditions, operating, abnormal and accidental. 
1.1.3.2. Minimize the impact of the thermo mechanical 
loads during operational transients X   
The structures of the REDAN will be submitted to lower thermal 
gradients and this is favourable versus the recommendation (To be 
assessed deeply through the systematic analysis of the plausible 
transients).   
1.1.3.3. Minimize the impact of the thermo mechanical 
loads during abnormal and accidental transients X   
Idem as above 
1.1.3.4. Minimize the number of components per system    Not applicable 
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TABLE 1 
CLASS 3 : Detailed & Technology neutral recommendations applicable to a given safety function 
Requirements applicable to the decay heat removal (DHR) safety function – Analysis of the concept with the “Stratified REDAN” 
 
Qualitative 
assessment Comments 
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1.1.4. Minimize the uncertainties about the operational plant 
conditions 
  X 
The concept relay on natural phenomena, such as the stratification within 
the REDAN, as well as the regulation for the EMP which, inherently, 
introduce uncertainties. Specific exhaustive instrumentation is 
requested to minimize and master these uncertainties.  
1.1.5. Work out and set up a simple information and control 
design  
  X 
Directly linked to the recommendation above (1.1.4). Specific attention 
should be given to the needs for the regulation. Within the REDAN 
there shall be sufficient and specific thermocouples poles to insure, 
through the EMP regulation, the homogeneous behaviour within the 
REDAN’s internal volume 
1.1.6. Work out and set up a simple layout 
X   
Despite the need for specific regulations on the EMPs, the concept looks 
globally favourable for there will be lower constraints for the thermo 
mechanical design of the primary circuit internals, the ISI&R and the 
maintenance. Quite large geometrical tolerances would be allowed. 
 
The overall results are encouraging but a number of concerns - or potential weaknesses - are highlighted, they are both on the design aspects 
and operation issues"; the interest of the analysis is to make the designer aware of these difficulties.  
The analysis also shows that a significant effort in terms of demonstration must be done to ensure operability with shall be both easy and 
reliable. 
The concept is, as expected, quite good – and likely better than conventional designs - for abnormal or accidental conditions. 
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Appendix 7 – Excerpt of the ISAM/PIRT analysis of the “stratified REDAN”  
FOM definition 
Steps for the definition of 
the Figures of merit  
Description of the Step’s content Comments 
1) Recall about the 
functional mission for 
the REDAN’s Structures 
during the Design Basis 
Conditions 
 
To guarantee allowable consequences for all the 
Design Basis Transient conditions 
 
2) Definition of the safety 
objectives  
To guarantee the core/fuel integrity during the 
considered transient  
The notion of core/fuel integrity is associated to the integrity of the fuel clads: 
failure and unallowable deformations have to be excluded during the transient. The 
core/fuel integrity is dependent from both the mechanical and the thermal loading 
on fuel’s clads. 
To guarantee the structures integrity during the 
considered transient (REDAN, components installed 
within the REDAN, other internals) 
The notion of structures integrity is associated with the keeping of the structures’ 
geometry which allows the achievement of the functional mission. The structures 
integrity is dependent from both the mechanical and the thermal loading. 
 
3) Definition of the safety 
missions that can lead to 
compliance with the safety 
objective. 
To allow implementing an adequate natural 
convection within the primary circuit, i.e. capable to 
remove the decay heat and to keep the clad 
temperatures within the allowable domain. 
The clad temperatures are established within a multidimensional domain: Thermal 
loadings on the clads = f(thermal/mechanical/hydraulic environment and 
operational & transient conditions) 
To allow maintaining acceptable loadings (thermal 
and mechanical) over all the structures during the 
transient; i.e. loadings within an acceptable 
multidimensional domain 
The structures’ thermo mechanical loadings are established within a 
multidimensional domain = f(thermal/mechanical/hydraulic environment and 
operational conditions) 
 
4) Identification of 
phenomena that affect 
the achievement of the 
safety missions, i.e. which 
allow defining both the 
effective thermal 
• Transient thermal hydraulic 
behaviour/response of the core and of the 
concerned volumes: natural convection through the 
core & the hot, intermediate and cold collectors. 
• Transient mechanical behaviour/response of 
It is worth noting that, during the considered transient, the Thermal hydraulic 
behaviour/response of the concept and the implementation of the natural 
convection (i.e. the velocity, flow, and temperatures fields through the core and 
within the collectors (cold, hot and intermediate)) will primarily define the thermal 
& mechanical loadings. All these loadings will so be strongly dependent from the 
dynamic and the efficiency of the natural convection. This can lead considering 
the Thermal hydraulic behaviour/response of the primary circuit as a 
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Steps for the definition of 
the Figures of merit  
Description of the Step’s content Comments 
mechanical loadings on the 
core and on the structures, 
and the core/structures 
capability to withstand 
these loadings 
the core and the structures (dynamic/vibratory) 
• Transient thermal behaviour/response of the 
core and the structures (transient “thermal fields / 
distribution” within the structures and, 
consequently, possible geometry changes) 
 
phenomenon of primary importance. 
Incidentally the designer has to consider the possibility for a transient feedback 
from both: the Mechanical behaviour/ response and the Thermal 
behaviour/ response of the core and the structures. 
For example the structures deformation and / or their thermal expansion, or the 
vibratory behaviour of these structures could affect the hydraulic within the 
collectors and so affect the efficiency of the natural convection.  
These interdependent phenomena shall be carefully considered through specific 
studies on fluid-structures interactions.  
N.B. In natural convection – if the core is correctly designed - the transient 
mechanical and thermal behaviour/response of the core is likely negligible 
compared to the changes of the Redan structures’ geometry but, within the PIRT, 
all these phenomena have to be considered, first of all to keep the designer aware 
about them and eventually to demonstrate that they are really negligible. 
 
ISAM/PIRT 
Primary pumps run 
down: transition 
“forced  natural 
convection” Figure Of 
Merit  
Phenomena 
Importance1 
(H, M, L, I) 
Status of 
knowledge2 
(FK, K, PK, 
LK) 
Description and Rationale 
FoM : Transient 
thermal loadings 
(T=f(t) and 
∆T=g(t)) on the 
Core structures : 
time dependence 
and amplitude 
(dT/dt and d∆T/dt) 
Transient thermal hydraulic 
behaviour/response of the 
core region (natural 
convection through the core) 
H 
K 
The transient thermal hydraulic behaviour/response of the core region shall allow 
the establishment of the natural convection and so the keeping of allowable thermal 
loadings on the core (T=f(t) and ∆T=g(t), dT/dt and the d∆T/dt on the fuel’s 
clads).  
This is why the importance of this phenomenon is considered “high” 
Transient mechanical 
behaviour/response of the 
core (dynamic/vibratory) 
L 
It is not expected that the transient mechanical behaviour/response of the core will 
strongly affect the establishment of the natural convection and incidentally the 
transient thermal loadings on the core. 
                                           
1 Importance: High (H), Medium (M), Low (L), Insignificant (I) 
2 Status of knowledge: Fully Known (FK), Known (K), Partially Known (PK), Limited Knowledge (LK) 
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Primary pumps run 
down: transition 
“forced  natural 
convection” Figure Of 
Merit  
Phenomena 
Importance1 
(H, M, L, I) 
Status of 
knowledge2 
(FK, K, PK, 
LK) 
Description and Rationale 
Transient thermal 
behaviour/response of the 
core (transient “thermal 
fields / distribution” within 
the structures and, 
consequently, possible 
geometry changes) 
 
M/H 
The transient thermal behaviour/response of the core region could affect the 
establishment of the natural convection, e.g. with unallowable clad expansion and 
corresponding hydraulic path reduction. Such behaviour will have feedback on the 
thermal loadings. This is why the importance of this phenomenon is considered 
“medium/high” 
FoM : Transient 
thermal loadings 
(T=f(t) and 
∆T=g(t)) on the 
Redan’s structures: 
time dependence 
and amplitude 
Transient thermal hydraulic 
behaviour/response of the 
concerned volumes (hot, 
intermediate and cold 
collector) 
H 
K 
The transient thermal hydraulic behaviour/response of the Redan volumes (hot, 
intermediate and cold collector) shall allow the establishment of the natural 
convection and so the keeping of allowable thermal loadings on the Structures 
((T=f(t) and ∆T=g(t), dT/dt and the d∆T/dt).  
Due to the inertia of the structures and of the collectors, the transient thermal 
hydraulic behaviour/response of the concerned volumes is not expected to abruptly 
affect the “stationary” component of these loadings and especially the mean 
structures’ temperature. Nevertheless the loss of the IHX as a mean to remove the 
decay heat will induce temperature increase (slow evolution?) and the phenomenon 
is of primary importance to assess the structure integrity.  
The time dependence and the amplitude of the loadings will be strongly affected by 
: 
o The characteristics of the transient (e.g. time constants)  
o The thermal characteristics of the structures’ material.  
Transient mechanical 
behaviour/response of the 
structures 
(dynamic/vibratory) 
L 
Without major failures or collapses which have to be prevented by an adequate 
design, low/insignificant influence/feedback is expected on the establishment of 
natural convention and so on the dT/dt and the d∆T/dt over the structure’s thickness 
as a result of the transient mechanical behaviour/response of the structures. 
Potential for structures vibrations has to be deeply assessed but this sort of 
phenomenon will primarily affect the mechanical loadings. 
Transient thermal 
behaviour/response of the 
structures (transient 
“thermal fields / distribution” 
within the structures) 
M/H 
In direct relation with the above “high influence” of the “Transient thermal hydraulic 
behaviour/response” a significant influence/feedback is expected on the dT/dt and 
the d∆T/dt over the structure’s thickness as a result of the transient thermal 
behaviour/response of the structures (expansion, deformation, etc.) 
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Primary pumps run 
down: transition 
“forced  natural 
convection” Figure Of 
Merit  
Phenomena 
Importance1 
(H, M, L, I) 
Status of 
knowledge2 
(FK, K, PK, 
LK) 
Description and Rationale 
FoM : Transient 
mechanical 
loadings(∆P =f(t)  
∆σ=g(t) and 
∆ε=z(t)) on the Core 
structures: time 
dependence and 
amplitude 
Transient thermal hydraulic 
behaviour/response of the 
core 
L/M PK 
From “mechanical loadings” point of view (∆P =f(t)  ∆σ=g(t) and ∆ε=z(t)), the risk 
comes from the hypothetical possibility to induce vibrations during the transition 
“forced  natural convection”; the phenomenon shall be addressed to exclude this 
possibility and to show that the establishment of the natural convection allows 
keeping allowable mechanical loadings on the core components. 
Moreover, the loadings are likely negligible compared to those induced by the 
thermal transient but, within the context of the PIRT, they shall be considered for, at 
the very end, the designer has to prove that they are really negligible. 
This is why, waiting for the demonstration, the importance of this phenomenon is 
considered “Low/medium”. 
 
Transient mechanical 
behaviour/response of the 
core (dynamic/vibratory) L  
It is not expected that the transient mechanical behaviour/response of the core will 
strongly affect the establishment of the natural convection and incidentally the 
mechanical loadings. As indicated above the potential for structures vibrations has to 
be assessed but this sort of phenomenon will primarily affect the REDAN’s 
structures. 
Transient thermal 
behaviour/response of the 
core (transient “thermal 
fields / distribution” within 
the structures): 
L  
The transient thermal behaviour/response of the core could influence the 
establishment of the natural convection, e.g. through clad expansion and 
corresponding hydraulic path reduction, but it is not expected that this will 
significantly affect the mechanical loadings.  
FoM : Transient 
mechanical 
loadings(∆P =f(t)  
∆σ=g(t) and 
∆ε=z(t)) on the 
Redan’s structures: 
time dependence 
and amplitude 
Transient thermal hydraulic 
behaviour/response of the 
concerned volumes (hot, 
intermediate and cold 
collector) 
M/H PK 
From “mechanical loadings” point of view (∆P =f(t)  ∆σ=g(t) and ∆ε=z(t)), the risk 
comes from the possibility to induce structures’ vibrations during the transition 
“forced  natural convection”; the phenomenon shall be addressed to exclude this 
possibility and to show that the establishment of the natural convection allows 
keeping allowable mechanical loadings on the core components. The loadings are 
likely negligible compared to those induced by the thermal transient but, within the 
context of the PIRT, they shall be considered for, at the very end, the designer has 
to prove that they are really negligible. 
The time dependence (i.e. the frequency for the vibrations) and the amplitude of 
these loadings will be affected by : 
o The characteristics of the transient (e.g. time constants)  
o The geometry of the structures 
(The mechanical characteristics of the structures (?)). 
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Primary pumps run 
down: transition 
“forced  natural 
convection” Figure Of 
Merit  
Phenomena 
Importance1 
(H, M, L, I) 
Status of 
knowledge2 
(FK, K, PK, 
LK) 
Description and Rationale 
Transient mechanical 
behaviour/response of the 
structures 
(dynamic/vibratory) 
M/H  
Potential for structures vibrations has to be deeply assessed during the transition 
“forced  natural convection”. The consequences could be important. 
If the structure is kept within the elastic domain, and with the exception of risk for 
induced vibrations, low influence/feedback is expected on the transient mechanical 
loadings as a result of the transient mechanical behaviour/response of the 
structures. The case of vibrations has to be assessed separately. 
On the other side the level of stress and strain field could induce plastic / permanent 
deformations which amplitude is defined by the structures mechanical 
characteristics. This is why it is important to correctly consider the mechanical 
behaviour/response of the structures  
Transient thermal 
behaviour/response of the 
structures (transient 
“thermal fields / distribution” 
within the structures) 
M  
The transient thermal behaviour/response of the structures will influence the 
establishment of the natural convection, e.g. through clad expansion and 
corresponding hydraulic path reduction (?), but, once the structures correctly 
designed (i.e. designed in such a way that the natural convection can be efficiently 
implemented) it is not expected that this will significantly affect the mechanical 
loadings.  
 
For the transition “forced  natural convection”, and following the PIRT exercise, the following recommendations can be drawn.  
The transient thermal loadings on the Core structures (T=f(t) and ∆T=g(t), dT/dt and the d∆T/dt on the fuel’s clads), and the phenomena 
which define such loadings, are obviously of primary importance but the available knowledge is quite good (scored “K”).  
Concerning the REDAN’s structures the situation is analogous and no specific “gaps” (i.e. important phenomenon with low knowledge) are 
identified.  
For the transient mechanical loadings (∆P =f(t)  ∆σ=g(t) and ∆ε=z(t)) the situations is likely quite different. The potential for vibration 
behaviour is identified and the detailed assessment of this sort of phenomenon in transient conditions is scored “Partially Known”. Nevertheless 
the phenomenon is not primarily important for the core structures while it is expected of medium / high importance for the REDAN’s structures. 
This can be considered as a “gap” and could justify specific R&D efforts to help the design stage and to validate the final solution. 
As for the previous examples, the results above show that the PIRT technique can be used to: prioritize confirmatory research activities to 
address the safety-significant issues; inform decisions regarding the development of independent and confirmatory analytical tools for safety 
analysis; assist in defining test data needs for the validation and verification of analytical tools and codes, and provide insights for the review of 
safety analysis and supporting data bases.  
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Appendix 8 – The Objective Provision Tree : Application to the JSFR concept 
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Level of Defense
Objective and Barriers
Safety function
Challenge
Mechanism
Provisions
To be achieved
To be protected
Need to be maintained
To cope with
To be prevented or 
controlled
To be implemented to 
prevent and/or control 
mechanism
Level 1 
Prevention of deviations from normal operation and failures
Control of reactivity 
Items to be satisfied: 
1)To avoid insertion of reactivity which demands countermeasures outside the normal control range
2)Guarantee the ability to safely shutdown the reactor
Change in core geometry Unexpected reactivity insertion
Unexpected 
mechanical 
loads
Core 
support 
failure
Core compaction 
under earthquake
Malfunction of 
reactivity 
control system
Operator 
failure
Adequate site 
selection
RV and 
supports 
seismically 
designed
Adequate and 
conservative 
structural 
design
Appropriate core 
design (limit 
effects of core 
compaction)
RCS fail -safe and 
seismic design of 
shutdown syst.
Surveillance of 
quality compliance
Design against rod 
ejection 
Limited reactivity 
worth of control rod
Negative reactivity 
coefficient
Design margins 
minimizing the 
need for operator 
control
Adequate 
operating 
procedure
Qualified 
operators 
Operator 
retraining 
program 
Negative reactivity 
coefficient
Fig. A8-1  JSFR Level 1 of defense in depth: OPT for safety function 1: control of reactivity 
Bubble mixing 
or oil ingress
Adequate design 
to prevent bubble 
mixing
Adequate design 
to prevent oil 
ingress
Adequate site 
selection 
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Level of Defense
Objective and Barriers
Safety function 
Challenge
Mechanism 
Provisions
To be achieved
To be protected
Need to be maintained
To cope with
To be 
prevented or 
controlled 
To be 
implemented 
to prevent 
and/or control 
mechanism 
Level 1
Prevention of deviations from normal operation and failures
Core heat removal
Items to be satisfied: transfer the power generated in the core to the BOP respecting 
allowed temperature ranges on fuel and structures during normal operation
Degraded or 
disruption of heat 
transfer path
Coolant flow 
blockages in the 
core
Degraded 
coolant 
flow
Coolant leakage 
(pipe break) or 
degraded 2ry heat 
removal 
Loss of 
ultimate 
heat sink 
(DHRS)
Debris Abnormal peaking 
factor due to 
incorrect core 
management
Reliability of 
heat transport 
system 
control 
Design to limit 
core bypass 
flow
Qualified IHX, 
SG and 
turbine 
Adequate 
passive 
DHRS T/H 
design
Procedures to 
minimize 
construction & 
maintenance 
debris
Design for 
retention of 
internal 
structures
Design of 
pump to 
prevent oil 
ingress
Adequate 
control rod 
management
Fig. A8-2  JSFR Level 1 of defense in depth: OPT for safety function 2: core heat removal 
Uncertain 
power 
measurements
Adequate 
measurements of 
Na flow and 
average core T -
inlet & outlet
Surveillance & 
system calibration
Anomalous 
temperature 
distribution in 
the core
Excessive 
power level
Cracking/ 
failure of 
fuel or 
structure
Design DHRS 
for 
maintainability
High quality of 
fuel elements
Minimizing 
thermo-
mechanical 
loads and 
cycles
Adequate 
refueling
Conservative 
structural 
design
Adequate 
structural 
materials
Surveillance of 
quality 
compliance
Conservative 
structural 
design
Surveillance of 
quality 
compliance
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Level of Defense
Objective and Barriers
Safety function
Challenge
Mechanism
Provisions
To be achieved
To be protected
Need to be maintained
To cope with
To be 
prevented or 
controlled
To be 
implemented 
to prevent 
and/or control 
mechanism
Level 1
Prevention of deviations from normal operation and failures
Confinement of radioactive materials
Items to be satisfied: 1) concentration of radionuclides (including fission products) below 
the limits established for normal operation conditions in the reactor coolant system and 
inside containment 
2) Guarantee the operability of control and safety system with the due reliability (maintain 
the equipment inside the technical spec.) 
Failure rate of 
fuel pin above 
limits for normal 
operation
Defects in as-
fabricated fuel 
pin
Exceeding 
fuel operating 
conditions
Degraded 
capability of Na 
purification system
QA  and QC 
of fuel design 
and 
fabrication 
Adequate 
margins for 
service 
conditions
Prediction and 
measurements of 
temp. fluence & 
burnup
Clear definition of 
normal and 
abnormal 
conditions
Fig. A8-3  JSFR Level 1 of defense in depth: OPT for safety function 3: Confinement of radioactive materials 
Excessive 
inventory of 
radionuclides in 
reactor coolant
Chemical 
attack on 
cladding 
Limiting oxygen 
concentration in Na
Avoid ingress of air 
and oil Limit radionuclide 
inventory in Na 
purification system
Design for external 
and internal hazard
Degraded 
capability of Ar gas 
processing system 
Clear definition of 
normal and 
abnormal 
conditions
Excessive 
inventory of 
radionuclides in Ar 
gas system 
Limit radionuclide 
inventory in Ar gas 
system
Design for external 
and internal hazard 
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Level of 
Defense
Objective 
and Barriers
Safety 
function
Challenge
Mechanism
Provisions
Level 2 
Control of abnormal operation and detection of failures 
Control of reactivity 
Items to be satisfied: to limit insertion of reactivity to minimize automatic trips, to keep variables within operating ranges and to
shutdown the reactor, if necessary.
Uncontrolled reactivity insertion
Malfunction of 
reactivity control 
system (RCS) 
Operator 
failure
Reactor core is 
continuously 
monitored 
Negative reactivity 
coefficient
Safety shutdown is 
available at all times 
Overriding priority 
for protection 
system
Reactor core is 
continuously 
monitored
Safety shutdown is 
available at all 
times
Negative reactivity 
coefficient
Fig. A8-4  JSFR Level 2 of defense in depth: OPT for safety function 1: control of reactivity 
Bubble mixing 
or oil ingress
Reactor core is 
continuously 
monitored
Insufficient provisions at level 1 
Safety shutdown is 
available at all 
times 
Negative reactivity 
coefficient
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Level of Defense
Objective and Barriers
Safety function
Challenge
Mechanism
Provisions
Level 2 
Control of abnormal operation and detection of failures
Core heat removal
Items to be satisfied: restore the balance between the heat generated and heat removed in 
order to comply with the allowed temperature ranges on fuel and structures established for 
anticipated operational occurrences
Degraded of heat 
transfer path
Coolant flow  
blockages in the 
core 
Loss of 
coolant 
flow
Leakage of coolant 
in the 1ry and 2ry 
circuit (pipe break)
Loss of 
ultimate 
heat sink 
(DHRS)
Debris Abnormal peaking 
factor due to 
incorrect core 
management
Automatic 
reactor 
shutdown
Secure flow 
coast down 
for 1ry circuit
Monitor 
DHRS for 
proper 
operation
Reactor core is 
continuously 
monitored 
Reactor 
shutdown is 
available all 
times 
Monitoring of 
activity in the 
1ry circuit
Fig. A8-5  JSFR Level 2 of defense in depth: OPT for safety function 2: core heat removal 
power 
measurement 
uncertainty
Monitoring of heat 
balance 
Anomalous 
temperature 
distribution in 
the core
Excessive 
power level
Fuel 
element 
cracking
Reactor 
shutdown is 
available all 
times
On-line 
characterizati
on and 
identification 
of leakages
Localization 
and isolation 
of leaking Na 
(double wall)
Insufficient 
provisions at level 1 
Leak before 
break
Margin in fuel 
thermal 
performance
Reactor core is 
continuously 
monitored 
Reactor 
shutdown is 
available all 
times 
Margin in fuel 
thermal 
performance
Margin
in heat 
removal
capability
Reactor 
shutdown is 
available all 
times 
Margin in fuel 
thermal 
performance
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Level of Defense
Objective and Barriers
Safety function
Challenge
Mechanism
Provisions
Level 2
Control of abnormal operation and detection of failures
Confinement of radioactive materials
Items to be satisfied: to keep the concentration of radionuclides in the reactor coolant 
system and inside containment below the limits established for anticipated operational 
occurrences
Failure rate of fuel pin 
above limits for 
anticipated operational 
occurrences
Defects in as-
fabricated fuel 
pin
Exceeding fuel 
conditions for 
anticip. Operat. 
occurrences
Fuel pin failure
Monitoring of 
cover gas 
radioactivity 
levels
Reactor core is 
continuously 
monitored 
Maintain fuel 
temperature 
distributions 
Monitoring of  
radioactivity levels
Fig. A8-6  JSFR Level 2 of defense in depth: OPT for safety function 3: Confinement of radioactive materials
Excessive 
inventory of 
radionuclides in 
reactor coolant 
cover gas
Chemical 
attack on 
cladding 
Monitoring coolant 
chemistry 
conditions
Shutdown at high 
activity levels Shutdown at high 
activity levels
Insufficient provisions at level 1
Shutdown at 
high activity 
levels
Maintain fuel flux 
and power 
distributions 
Shutdown at high 
activity levels
High radiation 
levels in 
containment
Degraded 
capability of Ar gas 
processing system
Monitoring of 
radioactivity levels 
inside containment 
Shutdown at high 
activity levels
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Level of 
Defense
Objective 
and Barriers
Safety 
function
Challenge
Mechanism
Provisions
Level 3
Control of of accidents within the design basis
Control of reactivity 
Items to be satisfied: to limit the consequences of the maximum postulated insertion rate and 
amount of reactivity into the core, and to achieve and maintain adequate shutdown conditions 
Uncontrolled 
reactivity insertion
Uncontroll
ed rod 
withdrawal
Insufficient 
shutdown 
reactivity
Diverse and 
redundant activation 
system
Seismic and single 
failure criteria design
Absorbers insertion by 
gravity and by 
acceleration 
mechanism   
Fig. A8-7  JSFR Level 3 of defense in depth: OPT for safety function 1: control of reactivity
Return to 
criticality during 
cooldown 
Sufficient reactivity 
margin to secure 
cold shutdown
Insufficient provisions at level 1 
and 2 
Operator 
error
Core 
compaction 
under 
earthquake
Negative power 
reactivity coefficient
One rod stuck margin
Low excess 
reactivity
Inability to shutdown 
the reactor
Failure on 
demand of 
shutdown 
system
Inability to maintain 
subcriticality
Large bubble 
mixing or oil 
ingress
Design to limit 
positive reactivity 
worth
Gas release paths 
to prevent gas 
accumulation
Reactor shutdown
Reactor shutdown
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Level of Defense
Objective and Barriers
Safety function
Challenge
Mechanism
Provisions
Level 3
Control of accidents within the design basis
Core heat removal
Items to be satisfied: adequate cooling of the fuel, vessel internals, vessel and reactor 
cavity by active/passive systems, via heat transfer to ultimate heat sinks, ensuring core 
geometry, and reactor vessel integrity
Degraded or 
disruption of heat 
transfer path
Long- term loss of 
forced convection 
Loss of 
ultimate heat 
sink (s) 
(DHRS)
Partial loss of 
DHRS 
functionality
Leakage of coolant 
(pipe break) 
Functional 
redundancy of 
DHRS
Functional 
redundancy of 
DHRS
Fig. A8-8  JSFR Level 3 of defense in depth: OPT for safety function 2: core heat 
removal 
Adequate 
margin to fuel 
failure temp.
Heat transfer by 
passive measure 
(DHRS) (natural 
convection and 
battery- operated air-
cooler dumpers)
Insufficient provisions at 
level 1 and 2 
Layout of piping 
(high position to 
maintain reactor 
level) 
Localization and 
isolation of 
leaking Na (GV & 
double wall 
piping)
Short-term loss of 
forced convection
Rapid reactor 
shutdown
Secure flow 
coast down of 
1ry circuit
Rapid reactor  
shutdown 
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Level of Defense
Objective and Barriers
Safety function
Challenge
Mechanism
Provisions
Level 3
Control of accidents within the design basis
Confinement of radioactive materials
Items to be satisfied: concentration of radionuclides (including fission products) below the limits 
established for design basis accident in the reactor coolant system and inside the reactor building.  
Releases to the environment below the limits established for design basis accidents
Failure rate of fuel pin 
above limits for design 
basis accidents
Defects in as - 
fabricated fuel 
pin
Fuel clad temp. above 
limit for degradation 
on cladding ability to 
retain F. P.
Excessive leakage 
or failure of Ar gas 
system
Hold up of F.P. 
in the liquid 
Na coolant
Maintain DHRS 
performance 
Conservative 
design limit for 
maximum fuel 
temperature
Shutdown the 
reactor
Fig. A8-9  JSFR Level 3 of defense in depth: OPT for safety function 3: Confinement of radioactive materials 
High radiation 
level in the 
containment
fuel operational 
conditions at 
excessive temp. 
fluence and/or burnup
Isolation of 
containment 
Insufficient provisions at 
level 1 and 2 
Limit leakages 
from primary 
systems
Degraded 
retention 
capability of the 
containment
Bypass of filter 
(containment open)
Annulus system
Containment 
system
Chemical attack 
on fuel cladding
Design to avoid 
ingress of air
and/or oil
Shutdown at high 
activity levels
Reliability of 
containment 
isolation system
Operation of 
Annulus system
Shutdown at high 
activity levels
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Level of 
Defense
Objective 
and Barriers
Safety 
function 
Challenge
Mechanism 
Provisions 
Level 4
Control of severe plant conditions, preventing accident progression, and mitigating 
the consequences of severe accidents
Control of reactivity
Items to be satisfied: to avoid return to criticality during severe accidents scenarios
Insufficient 
shutdown 
reactivity 
Additional passive 
shutdown system 
(SASS)
Fig. A8-10  JSFR Level 4 of defense in depth: OPT for safety function 1: control of reactivity 
Return to criticality 
during cooldown
Design of debris tray 
to maintain debris 
height below critical 
thickness
Insufficient provisions at level 1, 
2 and 3 
Inability to 
shutdown the 
reactor
Failure on 
demand of 
shutdown 
system
Inability to maintain 
subcriticality
Operator’s manual 
scram action
Unacceptable fuel 
motion reactivity 
insertion rate 
Design to limit 
positive void 
reactivity worth
Inability to avoid 
unacceptable 
power excursion
Unacceptable 
void reactivity 
insertion rate
Design to enhance 
molten fuel escape from 
the core region
To be achieved
To be protected
Need to be maintained
To cope with
To be prevented or 
controlled
To be implemented to 
prevent and/or control 
mechanism
Long- term debris 
cooling capability by 
passive DHRS
Two independent 
and diverse 
shutdown systems
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Level of Defense
Objective and Barriers
Safety function
Challenge
Mechanism
Provisions
Level 4
Control of severe plant conditions, preventing accident progression, and mitigating 
the consequences of severe accidents 
Core heat removal
Items to be satisfied: Transfer the heat generated in the core to the ultimate heat sink 
for maintaining core coolable geometry and integrity of the vessel 
and vessel support structure 
Degraded or 
disruption of heat 
transfer path
Degradation of the 
thermal 
characteristics due 
to earthquake, fire, 
flooding…
Loss of 
ultimate heat 
sink (s) 
(DHRS)
Leakage of coolant 
(pipe break)
Measures to 
recover DHRS (for 
ex. Backup 
dumpers of air 
cooler)
Fig. A8-11  JSFR Level 4 of defense in depth: OPT for safety function 2: core heat removal 
Sufficient 
structural 
margin  
(for ex. seismic 
insulators) 
Insufficient provisions at 
level 1,2 and 3 
LCO: limiting conditions for operation
Robustness of guard pipe against double ended 
failure of 1ry pipe 
Reactor 
building 
accessibility 
for recovery 
action 
Sufficient time 
for mitigating 
actions
Reactor 
building 
accessibility 
for recovery
action 
Sufficient time 
for mitigating 
actions
Measures to stop leakage from guard pipe  (for ex. 
depressurization in the circuit)
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Level of Defense
Objective and Barriers
Safety function
Challenge
Mechanism
Provisions
Level 4
Control of severe plant conditions, preventing accident progression, and mitigating 
the consequences of severe accidents
Confinement of radioactive materials
Items to be satisfied: limit the off site doses below allowable limits 
Excessive 
mechanical load
Limit the mechanical 
energy release by 
design to avoid severe 
recriticality events
Fig. A8-12  JSFR Level 4 of defense in depth: OPT for safety function 3: Confinement of radioactive materials
Degradation of 
1ry boundary
Design margin of RV 
and 1ry boundary 
structures withstanding 
mechanical energy 
release
Insufficient provisions at 
level 1, 2 and 3
Degradation of 
containment 
capability
Excessive 
mechanical and/or 
thermal load
Design margins of containment 
withstanding severe accident 
loads 
To be prevented or 
controlled
To cope with
To be implemented to 
prevent and/or control 
mechanism
Excessive thermal 
load 
Design of Ar gas system 
to manage the 
pressurization within 1ry 
system due to fission 
gas release
Design of debris trays to 
maintain coolability of  
fuel debris for long -term
Design margin of DHRS 
for cooling the debris for 
long- term 
Recover DHRS 
performance 
Design margin of DHRS 
withstanding 
mechanical energy 
release 
Sufficient time 
available for 
mitigating actions
Accident 
management 
features, 
procedures
Measures to localize the consequence of sodium fire 
(for ex. Steel liner on the floor, separation of systems/ 
components, limit amount of air in each compartment)
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